Trois essais en théorie microéconomique by Lamirande, Patrick de
Universite´ de Montre´al
Trois essais en the´orie microe´conomique
par
Patrick de Lamirande
De´partement de sciences e´conomiques
Faculte´ des arts et des sciences
The`se pre´sente´e a` la Faculte´ des e´tudes supe´rieures
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Philosophiæ Doctor (Ph.D.)
en sciences e´conomiques
Septembre, 2006
c©Patrick de Lamirande, 2006
Universite´ de Montre´al
Faculte´ des e´tudes supe´rieures
Cette the`se intitule´e :
Trois essais en the´orie microe´conomique
pre´sente´e par :
Patrick de Lamirande
a e´te´ e´value´e par un jury compose´ des personnes suivantes
Michel Poitevin
pre´sident-rapporteur
Walter Bossert
directeur de recherche
Lars Ehlers
codirecteur
Yves Sprumont
membre du jury
Licun Xue
examinateur externe
Marie Allard
repre´sentante du doyen
ii
Re´sume´ en francais
Chapitre 1
Dans ce chapitre, je mode´lise un monopoleur multi-produit qui doit de´cider de monito-
rer ou non les achats de ses clients. Un contrat monitore´ ne peut eˆtre achete´ plus d’une fois
tandis qu’un contrat non-monitore´ peut eˆtre achete´ le nombre de fois de´sire´. Je trouve que
le monopoleur va toujours oﬀrir aux consommateurs au moins un contrat non-monitore´.
Chapitre 2
J’e´tudie la composition de l’ensemble des allocations pare´tiennes dans le contexte d’al-
location d’un nombre ﬁni de biens indivisibles entre un meˆme nombre d’agents. Chacun des
agents rec¸oit un bien et aucune compensation mone´taire n’est permise. Ce proble`me est
typiquement connu comme le proble`me d’allocation de maisons (house allocation problem).
Pour analyser la rationalisation d’un sous-ensemble d’allocations, j’introduis le concept de
cycle. Un cycle consiste en une se´rie d’allocations ou` chaque allocation est lie´e a` la suivante
par la meˆme re`gle de transition. Avec le concept de cycle, je trouve certaines contraintes
sur la composition d’un sous-ensemble d’allocations pour qu’il soit rationalisable.
Chapitre 3
Thomas et Worrall (1988) e´tudient le proble`me de design de contrat entre un travailleur
averse au risque et une ﬁrme neutre au risque lorsque qu’ils peuvent briser le contrat a` tout
moment. Dans ce chapitre, j’utilise la meˆme approche pour expliquer les fusions. J’utilise
des fonctions d’utilite´ de type CARA, ce qui permet de de´river explicitement le contrat
optimal. Ensuite, j’ajoute quelques hypothe`ses pour e´valuer les eﬀets d’une fusion entre
deux ﬁrmes ayant des revenus ale´atoires. Pour ce faire, nous eﬀectuons des simulations
nume´riques. De part les re´sultats, une fusion est souhaitable seulement lorsque les agents
ont un bas facteur d’escompte.
Mots-Cle´s : Monitoring, Monopoleur multi-produit, Pre´fe´rences multidimensionnelles,
Biens indivisibles, Cycles, Rationalisabilite´, Contraintes auto-exce´cutoires, Fusionnement,
Contrats optimaux.
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English summary
Chapter 1
The main purpose of the paper is to introduce the decision to monitor sales or not
in the multiproduct monopoly decision problem. To do so, I introduce the concept of a
monitored contract as contract that consumers can buy only once. On the other hand, a
non-monitored contract could be purchased in any quantity. Obviously, to oﬀer a monitored
contract, the monopoly should be able to observe and to control consumers’ choice. I ﬁnd
that the multiproduct monopoly will always oﬀer at least one non-monitored contract to
consumers.
Chapter 2
I study the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a ﬁnite number
of agents and a ﬁnite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good
and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem).
I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation
is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between
a subset of agents. I characterize the proﬁles of agent preferences when the Paretian set
has cycles.
Chapter 3
Thomas and Worrall (1988) study the problem of designing a contract between risk-
averse workers and risk-neutral ﬁrms when both of them could break the contract at any
time. In this paper, I use the same approach to study mergers. I model a CARA utility
function to derive explicitly the optimal contract and the value function for both agents
in the case where only two states of nature are possible. I use this approach to explain the
reason for a ﬁrm to merge with another one. Because the analytic solution is too diﬃcult
to derive explicitly with more than two states of nature, numerical simulations are used to
illustrate these cases. I ﬁnd that mergers will occur only when agents have a low discount
rate.
Keywords : Monitoring, Multiproduct monopoly, Multidimensional Preferences, In-
divisible goods, Cycles, Rationalisability, Self-enforcing constraints, merger, Optimal
Contracts.
iv
Table des matie`res
Re´sume´ en francais i
English summary iii
Table des matie`res iv
Table des figures v
Liste des tableaux vi
De´dicace viii
Remerciements ix
Introduction 1
1 Monitoring Costs for a Multiproduct Monopoly 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Multiproduct monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Remarks on assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Cycles and the House Allocation Problem 28
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Deﬁnitions and Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Properties of cycles and complete cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Cycles and Paretian sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Self-enforcing contracts, value functions and CARA utility functions
with an application to mergers 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
v3.3 CARA utility functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1 Conditions for a non-trivial solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.2 Pareto Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.1 Stand-alone case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.2 Merger case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Conclusion 97
Bibliographie 99
vi
Table des figures
1.1 Non-Degeneration of the Set of Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Allocation z and the cycle C (i, y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 Allocation z : ﬁrst case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Allocation z : second case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4 Allocation z : third case a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Allocation z : third case b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 First Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Second constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Both Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 First-Best Contracts and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Unconstrained Pareto Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 Stationary contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Pareto Frontier with no self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contracts . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.8 Pareto Frontier with self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.9 Certainty Equivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.10 Negative Correlation and Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.11 Positive Correlation and Merger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.12 Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with
ρ = −1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.13 Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with
ρ = −0.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.14 Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with ρ = 0 93
3.15 Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with
ρ = 0.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
vii
Liste des tableaux
I Utility of ﬁrm 1 in the stand-alone case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
II States of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
III Coeﬃcient of correlation and states of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
IV Net gain of utility from the merger (positive value in bold) . . . . . . . . . 87
V Thresholds for NTSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
viii
De´dicace
A` Lucien et Marielle...
pour la personne que je suis,
A` Ve´ronique...
pour la personne que je veux eˆtre,
A` Daphne´e et ses fre`res et soeurs...
pour la personne que je serai.
ix
Remerciements
En premier lieu, je tiens a` remercier mes directeurs, les professeurs Walter Bossert et Lars
Ehlers, ainsi que les professeurs Yves Sprumont et Michel Poitevin pour leur disponibilite´,
leur professionnalisme et leur de´vouement. Leurs nombreux commentaires m’ont permis
d’acque´rir une discipline certaine dans la re´daction d’articles scientiﬁques.
En second lieu, je ne peux passer sous silence l’impact de Yves Richelle sur mon chemine-
ment acade´mique. Il fut un e´le´ment important du succe`s de mon doctorat. J’ai le privile`ge
de l’avoir comme ami.
En troisie`me lieu, ma famille et mes amis ont eu un roˆle non-ne´gligeable dans la re´daction
de ma the`se. Depuis presque 4 ans, ils ont duˆ supporter mes variations d’humeur au gre`s
de la re´daction. Quelques fois, ce ne fut pas une mince aﬀaire.
Pour terminer, je remercie le CIREQ, le SSHRC et le FCAR pour leur contribution ﬁ-
nancie`re ainsi que le Bureau de la concurrence pour m’avoir permis de terminer ma the`se.
Introduction
A distinctive feature of microeconomic
theory is that it aims to model economic acti-
vity as an interaction of individual economic
agents pursuing their private interests.
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [8].
Les incitations e´conomiques sont a` la base des de´cisions des individus dans la vie de
tous les jours. Que ce soit pour l’achat ou la vente de biens, l’oﬀre de travail ou d’e´lection,
les individus choisissent l’option qui, en fonction de la situation a` laquelle ils font face,
maximise leur bien-eˆtre. La mode´lisation microe´conomique des de´cisions individuelles des
agents constitue donc un outil privile´gie´ pour l’analyse de questions aussi inte´ressantes
que diversiﬁe´es comme le design de contrats d’assurance, les strate´gies de mise en marche´
ou encore les proble`mes d’allocation de biens indivisibles entre individus.
Dans le premier essai de ma the`se, j’e´tudie le comportement strate´gique d’une ﬁrme
ayant un pouvoir de monopole sur plusieurs marche´s. Plus pre´cise´ment, l’objectif est de
mieux comprendre comment la ﬁrme de´cide d’eﬀectuer du monitoring ou non. Je de´ﬁnis
le monitoring comme la capacite´ pour la ﬁrme de suivre et de controˆler les achats de ses
biens.
Pour vendre ses produits, la ﬁrme multiproduit peut avoir recours a` la vente groupe´e
(bundling) ou a` la vente se´pare´e. Par exemple, la plupart des chaˆınes de restauration rapide
oﬀre la possibilite´ d’acheter divers biens sous forme de trios. Lorsque les demandes ne sont
pas unitaires1, la ﬁrme peut de´cider d’oﬀrir des contrats qui ne peuvent eˆtre achete´s plus
d’une fois. Dans ce cas, nous dirons que le contrat est monitore´. Si la ﬁrme ne controˆle pas
le nombre de fois que les consommateurs peuvent acheter un contrat donne´, alors nous
dirons que ce contrat est non-monitore´.
Jusqu’a` maintenant, l’e´tude du monitoring se faisait au niveau des conse´quences de
1Nous disons qu’une demande est unitaire quand les consommateurs obtiennent un gain d’utilite´ seule-
ment de la premie`re unite´ de bien consomme´e. Une laveuse et une se´cheuse sont des exemples de biens
pour lesquels les consommateurs ont des demandes unitaires.
2monitorer ou non. La quasi-majorite´ des articles sur la tariﬁcation non-line´aire2 utilisent
implicitement (ou explicitement) l’hypothe`se que la ﬁrme est capable de suivre et de
restreindre les possibilite´s d’achat des consommateurs. La possibilite´ de ne pas monitorer
fut e´tudie´e exclusivement par Katz [5]. Cependant, aucun article ne mode´lise la prise de
de´cision de monitorer ou non.
Dans cet essai, je pre´sente un mode`le qui incorpore la de´cision de monitorer ou non
pour un monopoleur multiproduit. Une ﬁrme utilise le monitoring si elle oﬀre au moins un
contrat monitore´. Cependant, il est important de souligner que la de´cision de monitorer
n’impose pas de monitorer tous les contrats. Il est toujours possible pour la ﬁrme d’utiliser
des strate´gies mixtes lors de la mise en marche´ des contrats. Un premier re´sultat est
que, peu importe la fonction de couˆts administratifs, la ﬁrme va toujours oﬀrir au moins
un contrat non-monitore´. Ce re´sultat est cohe´rent avec les observations. Il semble que
l’ensemble des ﬁrmes oﬀrent toujours la possibilite´ aux consommateurs d’acheter un type
de contrat sans controˆle sur la quantite´ de fois qu’ils ache`tent ce dit-contrat.
Dans le second essai, le sujet d’e´tude est la rationalisation d’un ensemble de re´alisations
dans le cadre d’allocation de biens indivisibles (House Allocation Problem). J’entends par
rationalisation d’un ensemble A l’existence d’un proﬁl de pre´fe´rences individuelles qui a
comme ensemble des optimums de Pareto l’ensemble A. L’allocation de biens indivisibles
est un proble`me commun dans la vie de tous les jours. On peut penser a` la re´partition
des chambres parmi des colocataires, les charges de cours entre professeurs ou aux espaces
de bureaux entre colle`gues de travail. Ce type de proble`me fut introduit par Shapley et
Scarf [12] et e´tudie´ par de nombreux auteurs dont Roth et Postlewaite [11], Svensson [13]
et Ehlers [3].3
L’objectif de cet essai est d’introduire le concept de rationalisation dans un cadre
d’allocation de biens indivisibles. Pour ce faire, j’introduis le concept de cycle qui consiste
en une se´rie d’allocations ou` chaque allocation est lie´e a` la suivante par la meˆme re`gle de
transition. Un premier re´sultat de´coulant de la pre´sence d’un cycle dans l’ensemble des
optimums de Pareto est que tous les individus doivent avoir les meˆmes pre´fe´rences sur les
biens qui se suivent dans le cycle. Deuxie`mement, si le cycle est compose´ d’un nombre
premier d’individus, alors tous ces individus doivent avoir les meˆmes pre´fe´rences sur les
biens qui composent ce cycle. Troisie`mement, je trouve que si l’ensemble des allocations
pare´tiennes contient un nombre minimal de cycles compose´s des meˆmes individus et des
meˆmes biens, alors tous ces individus doivent avoir les meˆmes pre´fe´rences sur ces biens.
Comme quatrie`me re´sultat important, je trouve des conditions sur le nombre d’allocations
que l’ensemble des optimums de Pareto doit contenir.
2Voir par exemple Goldman, Leland and Sibley [4], Mirman and Sibley [10], McAfee and McMillan [9]
ou Armstrong [1].
3Cette liste n’est pas exhaustive et ne ﬁgure qu’a` titre de re´fe´rence.
3Le troisie`me essai e´tudie les conse´quences d’une fusion dans le cadre d’un mode`le d’as-
surance avec contraintes auto-exe´cutoires. Nous disons qu’un contrat est auto-exe´cutoire
si, pour tous les e´tats de la nature et pour toutes les pe´riodes, les deux agents (l’assureur et
l’assure´) ont un gain a` respecter le contrat. Sans contraintes auto-exe´cutoires, le manque
d’engagement devient un proble`me. Lorsque les couˆts de faire respecter le contrat sont
e´leve´s et que les couˆts de changer de contrat est bas, un agent peut avoir inte´reˆt a` briser
le contrat suite a` la re´ve´lation de l’e´tat de la nature alors qu’il e´tait optimal ex-ante. Dans
le but d’e´liminer ce type de proble`me, j’utilise la meˆme approche que celle introduite par
Thomas et Worrall [14].
Dans la premie`re partie de l’essai, je suppose que les individus ont des pre´fe´rences qui
peuvent eˆtre repre´sente´es par des fonctions de type CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aver-
sion). Cette mode´lisation se distancie de celle de Thomas et Worrall [14] et se rapproche de
celle de Kocherlakota [6] en ce sens que les deux agents sont averses au risque. Avec cette
hypothe`se, je suis en mesure de solutionner explicitement le contrat optimal en supposant
que les deux individus ont le meˆme coeﬃcient d’aversion au risque. Sans cette hypothe`se,
je ne peux expliciter la solution. Puisque nous trouvons le contrat optimal dans toutes les
situations, je peux de´ﬁnir et tracer les frontie`res des optimums de Pareto selon les valeurs
des parame`tres. Les graphiques illustrent clairement que les frontie`res sont continues mais
non pas de´rivables en tout point.4
Dans un deuxie`me temps, je me suis inte´resse´ aux eﬀets d’une fusion entre deux ﬁrmes
ayant des revenus ale´atoires en pre´sence de contrats auto-exe´cutoires. Pour ce faire, j’ai
mode´lise´ deux ﬁrmes averses au risque qui ont un revenu ale´atoire et un agent neutre au
risque (le marche´). Une des ﬁrmes peut de´cider de ne pas fusionner ou d’acheter l’autre
ﬁrme au prix donne´ par l’e´quivalent certain. Dans le cas de la fusion (acquisition) ou de
la situation ex-ante, les deux ﬁrmes ont la possibilite´ de signer des contrats d’assurance
auto-exe´cutoires. Avec l’aide de simulations nume´riques, je trouve qu’une fusion peut eˆtre
proﬁtable lorsque le taux d’escompte est bas meˆme lorsque les revenus des ﬁrmes sont
corre´le´s.
4Kocherlakota [6] avanc¸ait faussement que les frontie`res des optimums de Pareto e´taient continues en
tout point. Ceci fut corrige´ par Koeppl [7].
Chapitre 1
Monitoring Costs for a
Multiproduct Monopoly
51.1 Introduction
Firms combine diﬀerent methods to sell their products. For example, many fast-food
restaurants oﬀer discount coupons on a speciﬁc meal while they allow consumers to buy
any quantities of meals at regular prices. In construction material stores, small buyers
face regular prices while big buyers have special discounts on their purchases. Deﬁning
monitoring as the control of consumers’ purchases, these examples suggest that ﬁrms use
monitoring in combination with usual non-monitored sales methods to maximize their
proﬁt.
The ﬁrst context where such control on consumer purchasing is studied in the economic
literature is the case of bundling that oﬀers consumers the possibility to buy a package
in addition to the possibility of buying goods separately. The ﬁrst complete model that
deals with the ability of a monopoly to oﬀer bundles was proposed by Adams & Yellen
[1]. These authors study a market for two goods where consumers have unit demands for
both products and they ﬁnd that bundling can be eﬃciently used to increase ﬁrm proﬁts
even though consumers’ utility for each good are unrelated. Some extensions to the Adams
& Yellen’s paper were made by introducing a joint distribution of consumer preferences
over the two goods as in Schmalensee’s [9] model. Monitoring in such a context gives the
monopoly the ability to restrain the set of possibilities available to consumers. For instance,
with monitoring, a monopoly that wants to sell two goods can oﬀer these goods separately
as well as in a bundle, but can force consumers who want to buy both goods to purchase
the bundle. The proﬁtability of such possibilities to restrict the opportunities available to
consumers are analyzed in McAfee, McMillan and Whinston [7]. These authors present
suﬃcient conditions over the joint distribution on consumers preferences under which
bundling gives more proﬁts than selling goods separately when consumers are monitored.
A second context where monitoring could be interesting to use is the case where ﬁrms
can practice some form of nonlinear pricing (usually called second-degree price discrimi-
nation). Nonlinear pricing exists when a ﬁrm in a single market sets diﬀerent unit prices
for diﬀerent amounts of goods purchased. Spence [10] presents a model in which a cen-
tral planner must maximize the aggregate consumer surplus without having the ability to
identify the consumer’s type but with the ability to monitor consumers, by observing the
quantities they buy. Goldman, Leland and Sibley [3] study explicitly the role of constraints
on the price structure. They ﬁnd that the price could be either upward or downward dis-
continuous in quantity with smooth and well-behaved demand and cost functions. Since
the 1980’s, many papers deal with the use of nonlinear pricing by a multiproduct mono-
poly. Mirman and Sibley [8] assume that consumers diﬀer by only one taste parameter
while McAfee and McMillan [6] examine the case where multidimensional consumer pre-
ferences can be represented by a single variable. In this last case, the analysis becomes
6identical to Mirman and Sibley’s. The ﬁrst paper considering multidimensional preferences
in a nonlinear pricing context is Armstrong [2]. Armstrong examines the decision problem
of a monopoly over many goods facing consumers with multidimensional preferences and
ﬁnds a method to resolve the mechanism design problem for some speciﬁc classes of cases.
Except for the paper by Katz [5], which studies the case when purchases are not
observable by the ﬁrm, all papers on nonlinear pricing assume that the ﬁrm is able to
monitor purchases. In Katz’s [5] paper, the case of a ﬁrm with monopoly power on a single
market which is not able to observe consumer purchases is analyzed and a characterization
of the optimal price schedule is obtained.
To my knowledge, no paper examines the ability of a multiproduct monopoly to decide
to monitor consumers purchases or not. The main purpose of the present paper is to analyze
a model where the decision to monitor or not to monitor is an endogenous decision. To
do so, I ﬁrst deﬁne a contract as a vector specifying a quantity for each good and a price
that will be paid by the consumer in exchange of the speciﬁed quantities. Then a contract
will be said to be monitored whenever consumers can buy such a contract only once, while
a non-monitored contract is a contract that consumers can buy without restrictions. In
such a framework, the decision to monitor corresponds to the decision to oﬀer a monitored
contract. However, monitoring is not an all or nothing decision. Indeed, the monopoly can
actually propose monitored contracts together with non-monitored ones. The main result
is that the set of contracts oﬀered by the monopoly will always contain a non-monitored
contract. This accords with the examples given above.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I introduce the model. The theorem of
existence and some characterization of the optimal strategy of the monopoly are described
in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 contains discussions on the basic assumptions and I conclude
in Section 1.5.
1.2 Model
I consider a situation where a multiproduct monopoly faces N consumers. Let N be
a natural number. The purpose of this section is to introduce the concept of monitored
and non-monitored contracts as well as the assumptions relative to the behavior of the
monopoly and of the consumers.
1.2.1 Multiproduct monopoly
A monopoly produces L goods and sells these goods through contracts. I assume that
the ﬁrm is risk neutral. The problem of the monopoly is to determine the number of
contracts as well as the composition of the contracts it will oﬀer to the consumers. I deﬁne
a contract as a vector that speciﬁes a quantity for each good as well as a price that the
7consumer who accepts the contract will pay in exchange for the quantities speciﬁed in the
contract. Precisely, a typical contract k is given by (q1, ..., ql, ..., qL, P ) where ql stands for
the quantity of good l that will be sold if the contract is accepted and P is the price paid
whenever the contract is accepted.
I also assume that the price element P is greater than or equal to  with  > 0. As
we shall see, this assumption is quite innocuous but will facilitate some of the arguments
made below.
I begin by describing the kind of contracts that can be proposed by the monopoly.
Monitored and non-monitored contracts
In this paper, I say that a contract kg is monitored if consumers cannot buy this
contract more than once. In addition, I assume that consumers can buy only one monitored
contract.
For non-monitored contracts, I assume that these contracts can be bought many times
and in combination with other contracts. To illustrate how monitored and non-monitored
contracts work, consider the following example.
Suppose the monopoly oﬀers two monitored contracts ka and kb and two non-monitored
contracts kα and kβ . Following the deﬁnition of a non-monitored contract, the contracts
given by δkα, σkβ or δkα + σkβ for δ, σ = 1, 2, ... can be bought by consumers. Following
the deﬁnition of monitored contracts, the contracts ka and kb are oﬀered to consumers
but not ka + kb or δka, σkb or δka + σkb since consumers can buy at most one monitored
contracts and do so only once.
In addition to these contracts, it is possible for consumers to buy a combination on
non-monitored contracts and one monitored contract. So the contracts given by ka + δkα,
ka + δkβ , ka + δkα + δkβ , kb + δkα, kb + δkβ and kb + δkα + δkβ are oﬀered to consumers.
To summarize, if the monopoly oﬀers two monitored contracts ka and kb and two
non-monitored contracts kα and kβ, then the following contracts are in eﬀect oﬀered to
consumers for δ, σ = 1, 2, 3, ...
ka, kb, kα, kβ
δkα, σkβ , δkα + σkβ
ka + δkα, ka + σkβ , ka + δkα + σkβ
kb + δkα, kb + σkβ , kb + δkα + σkβ
Let Km and Knm be respectively the set of monitored contracts and the set of
non-monitored contracts. With these sets, it is possible to construct the contract set
K(Km,Knm) which is the set of contracts which can be bought by consumers. Consi-
dering the preceding example, the set of monitored contracts Km is given by {ka, kb}, the
8set of non-monitored contracts by {kα, kβ} and the set of oﬀered contracts by :
K(Km,Knm) =

ka, kb, kα, kβ
δkα, σkβ , δkα + σkβ δ, σ = 1, 2, ...
ka + δkα, ka + σkβ, ka + δkα + σkβ δ, σ = 1, 2, ...
kb + δkα, kb + σkβ , kb + δkα + σkβ δ, σ = 1, 2, ...

These deﬁnitions have three immediate implications that must be noted. First, whe-
never the set of non-monitored contracts is empty, the set of proposed contracts coincide
with the set of monitored contracts, i.e., Km = K(Km, ∅). This follows from the deﬁnition
of a monitored contract. A second implication is that any contract kh ∈ K(Km,Knm) is
either a monitored contract and belongs to Km or an non-monitored contract and belongs
to Knm or a combination of non-monitored contracts and at most one monitored contract.
Thirdly, since the all elements of a contract are a real number, the sets of monitored
and non-monitored contracts are countable. This implies immediately that the contract
set is also countable. Furthermore, if Km = Knm = ∅, then K(Km,Knm) = ∅. This means
that inaction is possible for the monopoly.
The next step in the description of the model is to present assumptions relative to the
multiproduct monopoly cost structure.
Monopoly’s production and administration costs
Total costs for the monopoly consist of a production cost function which, as usual,
gives the cost associated with the provision of a given quantity of goods to the consumers,
and of an administration cost function which gives the cost to manage the set of proposed
contracts.
The function V : Rl+ → R+ gives the production cost which only depends on the
total quantity of goods provided to consumers. Let Q (N,Km,Knm) be the vector of total
quantity of each good produced. I assume further that the marginal production cost is
constant.1 So the production cost function becomes
V (Q (N,Km,Knm)) =
L∑
l=1
(cl ∗Ql (N,Km,Knm))
where cl is the marginal cost of good l and Ql (N,Km,Knm) is the total quantity of good
l produced. I assume also that cl > 0 for all l.
Note that I assume that the production costs do not depend directly on the number
as well as the kind of contracts in the set of proposed contracts. Only the total quantity
1This assumption can be relaxed but to keep the presentation simple, I use this assumption.
9of goods matters.
The function A represents the administration cost. I shall deﬁne Anm as the cost
function to administrate the non-monitored contracts while the cost function to manage
the monitored contracts will be denoted by Am. I assume that the cost of providing
non-monitored contracts and the cost of providing monitored contracts are (directly) in-
dependent. I then assume that administration costs are additive in the non-monitored
contract cost function Anm and the monitored contract cost function Am.
Regarding the non-monitored contract cost function, I assume that the cost to provide
one more non-monitored contract is constant. This means that
Anm (Knm) = |Knm| anm
with anm > 0 and where |X| denotes the number of elements of the set X.
For the cost to administrate monitored contracts, I assume that the number of consu-
mers buying a monitored contracts matters. This comes from the fact that, in order to
make such contracts eﬀective, the monopoly must follow each consumer to prevent multiple
purchases of these monitored contracts, which imposes a cost to the monopoly.
Let Nm(N,Km,Knm) be the number of consumers who choose a monitored contract
proposed in K(Km,Knm) or a contract in K(Km,Knm) that is a linear combination of
contracts, one of them being a monitored contract. This number is unknown by the ﬁrm
since the ﬁrm does not know consumer types. Nevertheless, once the ﬁrm determines the
sets of non-monitored and monitored contracts, consumers make their choice and their
action generates the monitored contract cost function. I have mentioned above that the
cost of providing a monitored contract does not relate directly on the set of non-monitored
contracts. With the last assumption, the monitored contract cost function now depends
indirectly on the set of non-monitored contracts since the latter aﬀects the number of
consumers buying a monitored contract.
Next, once again for simplicity, I assume that the monitored contract cost function is
given by
Am (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km) = |Km| am (Nm (N,Km,Knm))
Note that the assumption that the administrative cost is increasing in the number
of consumers buying a monitored contract implies that am() is also increasing in N . I
further assume that the unit administrative cost of a non-monitored contract, anm, is
strictly smaller than the unit administrative cost of a monitored contract am(), whatever
the number of consumers buying a monitored contract N .
Accordingly, the larger the number of consumers choosing a monitored contract, the
larger are the costs associated with the management of monitored contracts and therefore
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Fig. 1.1 – Non-Degeneration of the Set of Preferences
I have Am
(
N1,Km
)
> Am
(
N2,Km
)
whenever N1 > N2.
To sum up, assumptions imply that the administrative cost function of the monopoly
can be written as
A (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km,Knm) = |Knm| anm + |Km| am (Nm(N,Km,Knm))
with anm > 0.
1.2.2 Consumers
The utility level attained by consumer i whenever he buys contract kh = (qh1 , · · · , qhL, P h)
is given by u
(
θi, qh1 , ..., q
h
L
)−P h where θi = (θi1, · · · , θiS) is a vector of preference parame-
ters, i.e. preferences of consumer i with S ≥ L− 1. I shall assume that u is continuous in
qh and in θi, increasing and strictly concave in qh and satisﬁes
lim
ql→∞
∂u (θ, q1, ..., qL)
∂ql
= 0 l = 1, ..., L ∀qj ≥ 0, j = l, ∀θ ∈ Θ
Note that individuals with the preference vector θi have the same utility function. The
set of all preference vector, denoted by Θ, is a compact subset of RS. Preference vectors
are i.i.d according to the continuous probability distribution F (θ). I also assume that F (θ)
is non-degenerative, i.e., the probability that θi ∈ Θ˜ for all Θ˜ ⊆ Θ with Dim[Θ˜] < Dim[Θ]
is zero. This assumption is commonly used in the economic literature. For instance, if Θ
has only one dimension and the distribution is non-degenerative, the probability of getting
a speciﬁc θ is equal to zero. Figure 1.1 represents a case where Θ˜ is of dimension one while
Θ is of dimension 2.
In this paper, I also assume that consumers could buy nothing if they wanted. In
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this case, I say that the consumer buys the null contract k0 = (0, 0, 0, ..., 0). Then, the
problem of the consumer is to maximize his utility by choosing a contract in the set K0
which is the set of contracts oﬀered by the ﬁrm K(Km,Knm) plus the null contract i.e.
K0(Km,Knm) = K(Km,Knm) ∪ {k0}.
Let me denote by K∗
(
θi,Km,Knm
)
the set of contracts in the set K0 which maximizes
the utility of consumers whose preference vector is θi. I can immediately ask if there exist
consumers whose K∗
(
θi,Km,Knm
)
contains several contracts. To avoid this possibility,
I must add an assumption on utility function. The monotonicity in utility diﬀerence will
guarantee that the set of optimal contracts is a singleton for almost all types of consumers.
Definition 1.1 A utility function u
(
θi, qh
)
is ∆u-monotone if, for all q1, q2 such that
q1 = q2, ∃s ∈ {1, ..., S} such that ∀θi ∈ Θ, u (θi, q1)−u (θi, q2) is strictly monotone in θis.
The ∆u-monotonicity says that, for any pair of contracts k1, k2, if there is a θ such
that k1 and k2 give the same utility, then an inﬁnitesimal change in θs increases diﬀerently
the utility of each contract. One can say that if a function f is ∆u-monotone, then
∂2f(θ, q)
∂ql∂θs
> 0 or
∂2f(θ, q)
∂ql∂θs
< 0
In fact, ∆u-monotonicity is more than that. Take the function f(θ, q) = θ1(q1 + q2)2.
This function has positive cross-derivative if q1 and q2 are positive but it does not respect
the ∆u-monotonicity. Take the contracts q1 = (1, 2) and q2 = (2, 1) for example. For all
values of θ, the diﬀerence in utility with those contracts will remain 0. If a function is ∆u-
monotone, then each marginal utility associated with a given good is aﬀected diﬀerentially
by a change in a speciﬁc preference parameter.
By assuming that the consumer utility functions are ∆u-monotone, then I obtain the
following result.
Lemma 1.1 The probability of ﬁnding a proﬁle θi ∈ Θ such that K∗ (θi,K0) contains
more than one contract is equal to 0.
Proof. Take two contracts k1 and k2 belonging to K. Let Θ be the set of all preference
vectors such that, for all θ ∈ Θ,k1, k2 ∈ K∗ (θ,K0) and let θ1 belong to Θ.
Following the deﬁnition of K∗
(
θ1,K0
)
, if k1, k2 ∈ K∗ (θ1,K0), then :
u
(
θ1, q11 , ..., q
1
L
)− P 1 = u (θ1, q21 , ..., q2L)− P 2
Following the deﬁnition of the ∆u-monotonicity, there is a s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} such that
u
(
θi, q1
)− u (θi, q2) is monotone in θis.
Now, suppose there is an element θ2 belonging to Θ such that θ2s = θ1s . Because θ2 ∈ Θ
and by ∆u-monotonicity, there is another preference parameter t ∈ {1, 2, ..., S},t = s such
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that θ2t = θ1t . If not, θ2 can not belong to Θ. This means that any change in the parameter
s leads to a change in some other parameter(s) to maintain the equality
u
(
θ2, q11 , ..., q
1
L
)− P 1 = u (θ2, q21 , ..., q2L)− P 2
Then, the set Θ has a dimensionality lower than Θ. By the non-degeneration of Θ, the
probability of having an agent with a preference vector θ belonging to Θ is equal to 0.
Since the contract set is countable, I can conclude that the probability of having prefe-
rences such that there exist more than one optimal contract is 0.
Note that this assumption of ∆u-monotonicity does not constrain too much as shown
by following example
Example 1.1 Take the case where the utility function is represented by a square root
function. Now, take two contracts k1, k2 such that q1 = q2 and suppose that there is
θ1 ∈ Θ such that q1 and q2 belong to K∗ (θ1,K0). This means
θ11
(
q11
)1/2 + θ12 (q12)1/2 = θ11 (q21)1/2 + θ12 (q22)1/2
Because q1 = q2, there is at least one l = 1, 2, ..., L such that q1l = q2l . Without loss of
generality, suppose that q12 > q
2
2 Then,
θ11
(
q11
)1/2 + θ12 (q12)1/2 − θ11 (q21)1/2 + θ12 (q22)1/2
increases if θ2 increases.
Because the contract set is countable, the probability of having more than one optimal
contract is 0.
Note also that the Cobb-Douglas utility function u
(
θi, qh
)
=
(
qh1
)θi1 (qh2 )θi2 does not
respect the property of ∆u-monotonicity since when one quantity equals zero the utility
levels are equal to zero irrespective of the value of θi. However the log transformation of
the Cobb-Douglas utility will respect the ∆u-monotonicity property.2
1.3 Results
The ﬁrm’s problem can be described as choosing the number of monitored and non-
monitored contracts and the composition of each of them. I shall denote by π (N) the
maximal proﬁt the monopoly can obtain when it faces N consumers. By assuming that
2If I deﬁne the weak ∆u-monotonicity with adding that q1 and q2 must be composed of positive elements,
i.e. q1  0 and q2  0, then the Cobb-Douglass utility function satisﬁes the weak ∆u-monotonicity.
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the ﬁrm is risk-neutral, I can write the proﬁt function in the following way :
π (N) = max
Km,Knm
E[R (N,Km,Knm)− C (N,Km,Knm)]
where R () and C () are respectively total revenues and total costs for the ﬁrm when
the chosen monitored and non-monitored contract sets are Km,Knm and the number of
consumers N .
I suppose that the ﬁrm is unable to observe consumer preference proﬁles and consumers
are not allowed to resell the quantity bought from the ﬁrm. Let the term Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
be the probability that a consumer buys the contract kh, i.e. Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
=
Pr
(
θi ∈ Θ|kh ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)). Then, expected revenues can be written as follows
E[R (N,Km,Knm)] = N ∗
∑
kh∈K
(
P h ∗ Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
))
.
In the previous subsection 1.2.1, I deﬁne the cost function like the sum of the production
costs and the administration costs, i.e.,
C(N,Km,Knm) = V (Q(N,Km,Knm)) +A (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km,Knm)
By assuming that the production cost is linear in quantities, the production cost func-
tion is given by V (Q) =
∑L
l=1 (cl ∗Ql(N,Km,Knm)). With the assumption of risk neu-
trality by the ﬁrm, the expected value of the production cost, E[V (Q)], is given by
E[V (Q)] =
L∑
l=1
(cl ∗E[Ql(N,Km,Knm)])
E[Ql(N,Km,Knm)] denotes the expected total quantity of good l produced by the
ﬁrm and equals
N
∑
kh∈K(Km,Knm)
(
qhl ∗ Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
))
In other words, the expected total quantity of good l is given by the sum (over the
contracts belonging to the contract set K) of the quantity of good l speciﬁed in a contract
times the expected number of consumers buying this contract. It follows that E[V (Q)]
can be written as
E[V (Q)] = N ∗
L∑
l=1
∑
kh∈K(Km,Knm)
(
cl ∗ qhl ∗ Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
))
As speciﬁed in Section 1.2.1, the administrative cost function is the sum of the moni-
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tored contract cost function and the non-monitored contract cost function. The expected
administrative cost function will therefore be given by
E[A (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km,Knm)] = |Knm| anm + |Km|E[am (Nm(N,Km,Knm))]
Let amE (N,K
m,Knm) be the expected value of am (Nm(N,Km,Knm)). With this no-
tation, the expected administration cost function becomes :
E[C (N,Km,Knm)] = N ∗
L∑
l=1
∑
kh∈K(Km,Knm)
(
clq
h
l Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
))
+ |Knm| anm + |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
To sum up, the maximal proﬁt the monopoly, π(N), can be written as
π (N) = max
Km,Knm
N ∗
∑
kh∈K(Km,Knm)
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
clq
h
l
))
− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
(1.1)
Expressed in this way, there could be situations where π(N) does not exist since the
maximization problem has no solution. Indeed, whenever the contract set K contains a
non-monitored contract, K has an inﬁnite number of elements so that the function to
be maximized involves a sum over an inﬁnite number of elements and this sum will not
necessarily give a real number. I must therefore address this problem immediately. We
have already seen that each contract can be expressed as a combination of non-monitored
contracts and no more than one monitored contract. I can then rewrite (1.1) in terms
of non-monitored and monitored contracts instead of the whole set of contracts. However
there are still many possibilities whereby non-monitored contracts and monitored contracts
can be combined to obtain the same kh belonging to K(Km,Knm). The ﬁrst possibility is
when there are β1, β2 such that, for a given kg belonging to Km ∪{k0}, kh can be written
as
kh = kg +
∑
kj∈Knm
β1j k
j = kg +
∑
kj∈Knm
β2j k
j
The second possibility is when kh can be expressed as two diﬀerent combinations of
monitored and non-monitored contracts :
kh = kg +
∑
kj∈Knm
β1j k
j = kf +
∑
kj∈Knm
β2j k
j
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with kg, kf belonging to Km ∪ {k0}.
If no other structure is added, I could have a problem with double counting. Let me ﬁrst
deﬁne the lexicographic dominance of a vector. I say that a vector β1 is lexicographically
dominated by β2 if
β11 < β
2
1
or β11 = β
2
1 and β
1
2 < β
2
2
or β11 = β
2
1 , β
1
2 = β
2
2 and β
1
3 < β
2
3
...
Let Km0 = K
m ∪ {k0} be the set of monitored contracts and the null contract. I deﬁne
W
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
, for any kh belonging to K(Km,Knm), as the set of all pairs of kg be-
longing to Km0 and β ∈ N |K
nm|
0 such that k
h = kg +
∑
ki∈Knm β
iki. Let ω
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
be the pair (kg, β) belonging to W
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
such that β is lexicographically domi-
nated by β˜ for all other pairs
(
kf , β˜
)
in W
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
. ω
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
is unique
because the lexicographic ordering is complete and transitive and if β = β˜, then kg = kf .
Let W˜ (Km,Knm) = {ω (kh,Km,Knm) |kh ∈ K(Km,Knm)} and let Ψ(η) = {K˜ ⊂ R |
|K˜| = η}.
With all the deﬁnitions introduced, I can write the proﬁt maximization problem like
a double maximization where the ﬁrst one is made on the number of non-monitored and
monitored contracts and the second on the composition of those contracts. Formally,
π (N) = max
ηm,ηnm
max
Km∈Ψ(ηm),Knm∈Ψ(ηnm)
N
∑
kg∈Km0
∑
β∈Nηnm
I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)
]
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
∗
P g + ηnm∑
j=1
βjP
j −
L∑
l=1
cl ∗
qgl + ηnm∑
j=1
βjq
j
l

− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
(1.2)
where I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)
]
is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if the
condition is respected and 0 otherwise.
I have once again a summation over an inﬁnite number of elements, but many of them
are irrelevant for the problem. Indeed, since the marginal utility goes to zero when the
quantity goes to inﬁnity, for any θi belonging to Θ the utility converges to a level u
(
θi
)
when quantities go to inﬁnity. The utility function being continuous in θi, the function
u
(
θi
)
is also continuous in θi. Accordingly, there is a θi ∈ Θ maximizing u (θi). Let
uMAX be the maximum utility a consumer could obtain when quantities go to inﬁnity.
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Because the utility function is quasilinear in price, the maximum revenue the ﬁrm could
earn is given by NuMAX . For a number η of contracts oﬀered, the minimal administration
cost3 is given by ηanm. This implies that the maximum number of non-monitored and
monitored contracts is equal to NuMAXanm since, otherwise, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be negative
with probability 1. Let B̂ = {β ∈ Nηnm0 |
∑ηnm
j=1 βj ≤ NuMAXanm }. It now follows that Problem
(1.2) can be equivalently written as follows :
π (N) = max
ηm,ηnm
max
Km∈Ψ(ηm),Knm∈Ψ(ηnm)
N ∗
∑
kg∈Km0
∑
β∈ B
I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)
]
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
∗
P g + ηnm∑
j=1
βjP
j −
L∑
l=1
cl ∗
qgl + ηnm∑
j=1
βjq
j
l

− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
(1.3)
The maximization problem is now well deﬁned. I now show that this problem has a
solution.
Proposition 1.1 For any ﬁnite number of consumers, there is a solution to the proﬁt
maximization problem (1.3).
Proof. I proceed in four steps. The ﬁrst step is ﬁnding the contract k∗
(
θi
)
which is
the contract
(
q∗
(
θi
)
, P ∗
(
θi
))
such that
q∗
(
θi
)
= argmax
q≥0
u
(
θi, q
)− L∑
l=1
clql (1.4)
P ∗
(
θi
)
= u
(
θi, q∗
(
θi
))
(1.5)
By the concavity of the utility function and by the assumption that the marginal utility
goes to 0 when the quantity goes to inﬁnity, there is a solution to (1.4) and (1.5). Also,
with the assumption of strict concavity, k∗
(
θi
)
is unique4. I deﬁne π∗
(
θi
)
the proﬁt given
by the contract k∗
(
θi
)
, i.e.,
π∗
(
θi
)
= P ∗
(
θi
)− L∑
l=1
clq
∗
l
(
θi
)
Let qMAXl be the maximum quantity of goods l a consumer of type θ
i ∈ Θ obtained in
3Remember that the cost to oﬀer a monitored contract exceeds the cost to oﬀer a non-monitored
contract.
4k∗

θi

is the perfect price discrimination contract.
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k∗
(
θi
)
, i.e.
qMAXl = max
θi∈Θ
q∗l
(
θi
)
.
By the continuity of the utility function in θi and the compactness of Θ, qMAXl is upper-
bounded. I can proceed by the same approach with PMAX and πMAX .
PMAX = max
θi∈Θ
P ∗
(
θi
)
πMAX = max
θi∈Θ
π∗
(
θi
)
I then deﬁne the set ∆.
∆ = {(q, P ) | ql ∈
[
0, qMAXl
] ∀l = 1, 2, ..., L, and P ∈ [0, PMAX]}
Note that ∆ is a compact set by construction.
As already discussed above, I show in the second step that the ﬁrm could only oﬀer a
ﬁnite number of monitored and non-monitored contracts. If the number of consumers is
N , then the maximum proﬁt the ﬁrm could obtain without counting the administration cost
A (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km,Knm) is NπMAX . I deﬁne η the maximum number of monitored
and non-monitored contracts the ﬁrm could oﬀer with the possibility to make a proﬁt. With
the assumption that anm < am (Nm (N,Km,Knm)), the maximum number of monitored
and non-monitored contracts is given by :
NπMAX − ηanm > 0
NπMAX − (η + 1) anm ≤ 0
Because NπMAX is upper bounded, that means the monopoly will never oﬀer an inﬁnite
number of non-monitored or monitored contracts (η <∞).
The third step consists of proving that
N ∗
∑
kg∈Km0
∑
β∈ B
I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)
]
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
∗
P g + ηnm∑
j=1
βjP
j −
L∑
l=1
cl ∗
qgl + ηnm∑
j=1
βjq
j
l

− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
(1.6)
is continuous in qg and P g for all kg belonging to Km and continuous in qj and P j for
all kj belonging to Knm.
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The term |Knm| anm is obviously continuous since it is a constant. The expected mo-
nitored contract cost function amE (N,K
m,Knm) is function of the number of consumers
buying a monitored contract. Because I take the expectation and the distribution function
of θi is non-degenerative, then amE (N,K
m,Knm) is continuous in qz and P z.
I now examine the terms in the summation. To do this let me begin by deﬁning δt as
the vector
(
{δjt }ηnmj=1 , {δgt }ηnm+ηmg=ηnm+1
)
.
Then Km and Knm be the contract sets with ηm monitored contracts and ηnm non-
monitored contracts. I deﬁne Kmt and Knmt the monitored and non-monitored contract
sets such that kgt = k
g + δgt for all k
g belonging to Km and kjt = k
j + δjt for all k
j belonging
to Knm.
To prove the continuity of the terms in the summation in (1.6), I must discuss two
cases.
The ﬁrst case is when, for all kg belonging to Km, for all β belonging to Bˆ and for any
sequence {δt} that converges to the zero vector whenever t tends to inﬁnity, the indicator
function I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] = I [(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] for all t. In this
case, the sum of the indicator function times the probability becomes a sum of probabilities.
By deﬁnition, if the indicator function is equal to 1 for a given pair (kg, β), then
there is no other pair
(
kf , βf
)
with kf belonging to Km and β belonging to Bˆ such that
kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j = kf +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j and such that βf is lexicographically dominated by β.
Then, I have to analyze the eﬀect of changes in qg, P g, qj and P j on the probability
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
evaluated at kg = kg, kj = kj and Km = Km,Knm = Knm.
Let kh = kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j. By deﬁnition, if kh ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm), then :
u
(
θ, qh1 , ..., q
h
L
)
− P h ≥ max
k
z∈K0
[
u (θ, qz1, ..., q
z
L)− P z
]
By Lemma 1.1, the probability that an agent has a preference proﬁle such that there
are two contracts belonging to K∗
(
θi,Km,Knm
)
is 0. Then,
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)
=
Pr
(
u
(
θ, qh1 , ..., q
h
L
)− P h > maxkz∈K0 [u (θ, qz1, ..., qzL)− P z] )
Because u
(
θi, qh
)
is continuous in θi and in qh and because the distribution function
of the θ’s is non-degenerative, I can use the Slutsky Theorem5 to prove that the probability
is continuous in qg, P g for all kg belonging to Km and in qj, P j for all kj belonging to
Knm.
The second case is when there is a pair
(
k
g
, β
)
with kg belonging to Km and β belon-
ging to Bˆ and a sequence of δt such that, for all t > t˜, I
[
(kgt , β) ∈ W˜
(
Kmt,Knmt
)] =
5See, for instance, Jacod & Protter [4] page 161.
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I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] .
To begin with, suppose that, for the pair
(
k
g
, β
)
, I
[(
k
g
, β
)
∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] = 1 and
I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] = 0 for all t > t˜. If I [(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] = 1, then
this means that, for all pairs
(
k
f
, βf
)
with kf belonging to Km and βf belonging to Bˆ
such that kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j = kf +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j, β is lexicographically dominated by βf .
If I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] = 0 for t > t˜, this means that there exists a sequence
of pair {(kzt , βz)}t>t˜ with k
z
t belonging to Kmt and β
z belonging to Bˆ such that kgt +∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j
t = k
z
t +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
z
j k
j
t and β
z is lexicographically dominated by β. Note however
that
lim
t→∞ k
g
t +
ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t = k
g +
ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
lim
t→∞ k
z
t +
ηnm∑
j=1
βzj k
j
t = k
z +
ηnm∑
j=1
βzj k
j
.
Accordingly, I ﬁnd that kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j is equal to kz +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
z
j k
j with βz lexi-
cographically dominated by β. This leads a contradiction which implies that there does
not exist a pair
(
k
g
, β
)
for which, for all t > t˜, I
[(
k
g
, β
)
∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] = 1 and
I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)]= 0.
Now, suppose that, for the pair
(
k
g
, β
)
and for all t > t˜, I
[(
k
g
, β
)
∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] =
0 and I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] = 1. This means that there is a pair (kf , βf) with kf
belonging to Km and βf belonging to Bˆ such that kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j = kf +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j and
βf lexicographically dominated by β. Without lost of generality, suppose there is only one
such pair. If I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] = 1 for all t > t˜, this means kgt +∑ηnmj=1 βjkjt
is not equal to kft +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j
t . Then, the probability that a consumer has preferences θi
such that either
(
k
g
t +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j
t
)
or
(
k
f
t +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j
t
)
belongs to K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
is given by
Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kgt + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
+Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
−Pr
θi ∈ Θ|
kgt + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t
 and
kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
t
 belong to K∗ (θi,Kmt,Knmt)

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By Lemma 1.1, if kgt +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j
t is not equals to k
f
t +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j
t , then the probability
that a consumer has a preference proﬁle such that kgt +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j
t and k
f
t +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j
t
belongs to K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
is zero. But by taking the limit of the preceding sum of
probabilities, I obtain
limt→∞ Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kgt + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
+Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
−Pr
θi ∈ Θ|
kgt + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t
 ,
kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
t
 ∈ K∗ (θi,Kmt,Knmt)

= Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kg + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

+Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kf + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

−Pr
θi ∈ Θ|
kg + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
 ,
kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
 ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

= Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kf + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

because kg +
∑ηnm
j=1 βjk
j = kf +
∑ηnm
j=1 β
f
j k
j.
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Then, by introducing the indicator function, I avoid double counting. I therefore have
limt→∞ I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)]Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kgt + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
+I
[(
k
f
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kt)]Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kft + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j
t ∈ K∗
(
θi,Kmt,Knmt
)
= I
[(
k
g
, β
)
∈ W˜ (K)]Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kg + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

+I
[(
k
f
, β
)
∈ W˜ (K)]Pr
θi ∈ Θ|kf + ηnm∑
j=1
βfj k
j ∈ K∗ (θi,Km,Knm)

where I
[(
k
g
t , β
)
∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] and I [(kft , β) ∈ W˜ (Kmt,Knmt)] are equal to one
while I
[(
k
g
, β
)
∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] is equal to zero and I [(kf , β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)] is
equal to one.
Then, (1.6) is continuous in qg and P g for all kg belonging to Km and in qj and P j
for all kj belonging to Knm.
For the fourth step, let π˜ (ηnm, ηm) be the maximum proﬁt obtained when the optimal
contract must be composed of ηnm non-monitored contracts and ηm monitored contracts.
π˜ (N, ηnm, ηm) = max
Km∈Ψ(ηm),Knm∈Ψ(ηnm)
N ∗
∑
kg∈Km0
∑
β∈ B
I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)
]
Pr
kg + ηnm∑
j=1
βjk
j ,Km,Knm

∗
P g + ηnm∑
j=1
βjP
j −
L∑
l=1
cl ∗
qgl + ηnm∑
j=1
βjq
j
l

− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE (N,Km,Knm)
In the previous step, I prove that the function (1.6) is continuous in qz and P z for all
kz belonging to Knm or to Km. Moreover, non-monitored and monitored contracts must
belong to ∆. Then, I use the theorem of the maximum to prove that π˜ (N, ηnm, ηm) exists.
Since η is ﬁnite, then the number of combinations of (ηnm, ηm) with ηnm + ηm ≤ η is
also ﬁnite. Consequently, there is a maximal element in the set
{π˜ (N, ηnm, ηm) | ηnm + ηm ≤ η}
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I can now examine if the maximal proﬁt π(N) is strictly positive for any N . This could
not necessarily be the case since I have assumed above that the monitoring cost function
is increasing in N . It could for instance happen that the proﬁt is strictly positive when
there are 10 consumers but equal to zero with 11 consumers. However, as shown by the
following result, I can state under certain conditions that proﬁts will stay strictly positive
when the number of consumers exceeds a critical level.
Proposition 1.2 Suppose that ∃l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} such that, for all qh with qhl = 0,
Pr
(
θi ∈ Θ | ∂u
(
θi, qh
)
∂qhl
> cl
)
> 0
There is a N such that ∀N ≥ N , the proﬁt is strictly positive.
Proof. Suppose that Km = ∅ and Knm has only one element which maximizes :
∑
kh∈K(∅,Knm)
Pr
(
kh, ∅,Knm
)
∗
(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
By assumption, I know that this term is positive. Then, I can set N such that
N ∗
∑
kh∈K(∅,Knm)
Pr
(
kh, ∅,Knm
)
∗
(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− anm ≤ 0
(
N + 1
) ∗ ∑
kh∈K(∅,Knm)
Pr
(
kh, ∅,Knm
)
∗
(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− anm > 0
The condition for a strictly positive maximal proﬁt is not a strong one. It says that
if there is a positive probability to ﬁnding a consumer with a marginal utility over at
least one good that is higher than the marginal cost to produce this good, then the ﬁrm
makes proﬁt when the number of consumers is high enough. The intuition for the proof is
simple. When the number of consumers increases, the administrative cost to provide one
non-monitored contract, which is constant with respect to N , becomes negligible. It will
then become possible to make strictly positive proﬁts whenever the number of consumers
becomes suﬃciently large.
Let me now study if the maximal proﬁt increases when the number of consumers
increases. The following result shows that this will depend on the form of the monitored
contract cost function.
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Proposition 1.3 If amE (N,K
m,Knm) is concave in N , then the proﬁt function is non-
decreasing in N . If there exists an N˜ for which the proﬁt is positive, then the proﬁt function
is increasing for all N ≥ N˜ .
Proof. Let K˜m(N) and K˜nm(N) be the optimal monitored and non-monitored contract
set when the number of consumers is N and let K˜ = K
(
K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
. By deﬁnition,
π (N + 1) ≥ (N + 1)
∑
kh∈ K
Pr
(
kh, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− |Knm| anm − |Km| amE
(
N + 1, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
where the right hand side is the proﬁt when the number of consumers is N + 1 and the
contract sets are K˜m(N) and K˜nm(N).
π (N + 1) ≥ (N + 1)
 ∑
kh∈ K
Pr
(
kh, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− |Knm| anm − (N + 1)
|Km| amE
(
N + 1, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
N + 1
By the concavity of amE
(
N, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
in N , then
amE
(
N, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
N
≥
amE
(
N + 1, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
N + 1
and therefore
π (N + 1) ≥ (N + 1)
 ∑
kh∈ K
Pr
(
kh, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− |Knm| anm − (N + 1)
amE
(
N, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
N
π (N + 1) ≥ N
 ∑
kh∈ K
Pr
(
kh, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
cl ∗ qhl
))
− |Knm| anm −N
amE
(
N, K˜m(N), K˜nm(N)
)
N
with a strict inequality if π (N) > 0. Note that the .right hand side of this inequality is
simply π(N) so that the results follow.
24
Without any assumptions on the concavity of the monitored contract cost function, it
is impossible to obtain any conclusions about the evolution of the maximal proﬁt π(N)
with respect to the number of consumers. It could happen that the increase in the cost
of monitoring contracts is more important than the increase in the revenue minus the
production cost. In this case, the proﬁt will decrease.
The second interesting question regards the composition of the optimal contract set.
The ﬁrst result found is that the monopolist will always oﬀer at least one non-monitored
contract. The following proposition demonstrates this result.
Proposition 1.4 Suppose K˜m and K˜nm are the optimal monitored and non-monitored
contract set. Then, there is at least one non-monitored contract, i.e. K˜nm = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that K˜nm = ∅. By deﬁnition, K
(
K˜m, ∅
)
= K˜m. In this case the proﬁt
function is :
N
∑
kh∈Km
[
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
clq
h
l
))
− amE
(
N, K˜m, ∅
)]
First, I know that the number of monitored contracts if ﬁnite. If not, the ﬁxed cost will
be inﬁnite. consequently, for each monitored contract kh belonging to K˜m,
Pr
(
kh,Km,Knm
)(
P h −
L∑
l=1
(
clq
h
l
))
− amE
(
N, K˜m, ∅
)
> 0 (1.7)
If there is a contract in which this condition is not respected, I could drop this contract
out without decreasing the proﬁt.
I deﬁne k ∈ K˜m as the monitored contract maximizing
(
P h −∑Ll=1 (cl ∗ qhl )). Let
Km = K˜m \ {k} and Knm = {k}. The proﬁt with Km and Knm is given by :
N
∑
kg∈Km0
∑
β∈ B
I
[
(kg, β) ∈ W˜ (Km,Knm)]Pr(kh,Km,Knm)
P g + ηnm∑
j=1
βjP
j −
L∑
l=1
cl ∗
qgl + ηnm∑
j=1
βjq
j
l

− anm − ∣∣Km∣∣ amE (N,Km,Knm)
By assumption, amE () > anm. Hence, the administration cost of oﬀering Km and
Knm is lower than the cost of oﬀering K˜m and ∅ respectively as the monitored and non-
monitored contract sets. Then, if the ﬁrst term with the contract sets Km and Knm is not
smaller than with K˜m and ∅, the point is proven.
Consumers who buy a contract under the contract set K(K˜m, ∅) can do three things
25
under the contract set K(Km,Knm) : they can continue to buy the same contract, they can
stop buying or the can change their choice for a new contract. By construction, K(K˜m, ∅) ⊂
K(Km,Knm). Consumers who buy a contract under K(K˜m, ∅) will never choose not to
buy a contract when they face the contract set K(Km,Knm) because they decide to buy a
contract belonging to K∗
(
θ, K˜m, ∅
)
and this contract is still available in K(Km,Knm).
Then, consumers must choose between a contract belonging to K∗
(
θ, K˜m, ∅
)
or ano-
ther contract. It is sure with probability equal to 1 that consumers will not switch to another
contract kh ∈ K˜m\{k}. If they do, this means K∗ (θ, K˜m, ∅) contains two contracts but
the probability that K∗
(
θ, K˜m, ∅
)
has two contracts is 0.6
Consumers really only have two possibilities : keep buying the contract they buy with
the contract set K(K˜m, ∅) or buy a contract k̂ which is a combination of the non-monitored
contract and of at most one monitored contract.
k̂ = kh + βk kh ∈ K˜, β ∈ {1, 2, ...}
But P̂ −∑Ll=1 (cl ∗ q̂l) ≥ P −∑Ll=1 (cl ∗ ql) which means that the ﬁrst term of (1.7) is
greater with K than with K˜.
This result is very interesting. It says that every ﬁrm will oﬀer at least one non-
monitored contract, which is what happens in the real economy. Many stores oﬀer some
special discounts to big buyers and oﬀer to others the possibility of buying without being
monitored. The stores open an account for big buyers and oﬀer a discount depending of
the total purchases.
Which form of administration cost function is more likely to occur ? The intuition
says that concavity for the monitored contract cost function is a realistic assumption. The
biggest cost of implementing monitoring structure is more a form of ﬁxed cost. Some ob-
servations strengthen this intuition. Convenience stores almost always oﬀer non-monitored
contracts and supermarkets oﬀer discounts on a speciﬁc quantity of goods. Also, if there
is an important ﬁxed cost to implement monitoring, only big surface selling stores will use
monitored contracts. On the other hand, one can argue that it becomes more complicated
to keep track of consumers as their number increases. Nevertheless, some technological
implements can contribute to diminishing the monitored contract costs.
1.4 Remarks on assumptions
To develop the model, I use strong assumptions on the utility function, the production
cost function and the monitoring cost function. I impose those assumptions to simplify
6See the proof of Proposition 1.
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the presentation of proofs. Many of these assumptions could be relaxed to more general
functions, however.
Regarding the utility function and the production cost function, I need assumptions
which would guarantee the existence of a solution to the proﬁt maximization problem. To
have a solution, it must be the case that, there is a q such that, for all q ≥ q, for all Q ≥ q
and for all θi ∈ Θ,
dv (Q1, ..., QL)
dQl
>
du
(
θi, q1, ..., qL
)
dql
∀l = 1, 2, ..., L
In other words, the marginal utility at q must be lower than the marginal cost to provide
at least q. For consumers, the assumption of strict concavity in q is not necessary. The
concavity is enough to have existence.
The assumptions about the monitoring cost function are more problematic to discuss.
In fact, it is very diﬃcult to specify the form of this function. It makes sense to have
a monitoring cost function increasing in the number of base contracts but the linearity
doesn’t look too realistic. But I do not need the linearity to prove its existence. I simply
need the assumption specifying an increase of the monitoring cost when the number of
base contracts increases.
A (Nm(N,Km,Knm),Km,Knm) > A
(
Nm(N, K˜m, K˜nm), K˜m, K˜nm
)
if
(ηnm, ηm) ≥ (η˜nm, η˜m)
(ηnm, ηm) = (η˜nm, η˜m)
where ηnm is the number of non-monitored contracts and ηm is the number of monitored
contracts. Without this assumption, I am not able to upper-bound the number of base
contracts. In this case the number of contracts could be inﬁnite and it is impossible to
guarantee a solution to the proﬁt maximization problem.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I try to model the ﬁrm’s decision when it involves monitoring. I ﬁnd some
suﬃcient conditions to get an existence proposition. It appears that the main assumptions
to guarantee a solution are more about consumer preferences and the production function
than about the monitoring cost function. I also ﬁnd some results on the characterization
of the optimal contract set under speciﬁc assumptions.
Another issue involves the deﬁnition of monitoring. I deﬁne monitoring as the capacity
to constrain consumers to buy no more than one contract, when in fact, other deﬁnitions
could also be used. For example, I could assume that a monitored contract could be bought
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with or without another monitored contract. But using alternative deﬁnitions complicates
the presentation of the results without providing additional insights on the problem of
monitoring.
In my opinion, future work on monitoring should study the uniqueness of the monopoly
solution problem. Uniqueness is not guaranteed under the assumptions introduced in this
paper and it seems that stronger assumptions on the utility function would have to be
made in order to obtain it. Another way to extend the present study of monitoring is by
developing the characterization of the optimal contract set. Also, the approach proposed
in this paper could be taken in the context of a regulated monopoly context in order to
examine whether the use of monitored contracts could increase welfare.
Finally, introducing monitoring in a duopoly, oligopoly or perfectly competitive fra-
mework seems to be the natural next step. But it seems to me that this step will be very
diﬃcult to take. The multidimensional preference proﬁles and good vectors complicate the
analysis of the stability of any optimal strategies. Furthermore, ﬁrms will not compete
only on quantities and on price, but also on the number of contracts and on their nature.
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Chapitre 2
Cycles and the House Allocation
Problem
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2.1 Introduction
The house allocation problem consists of the assignment of indivisible goods to a set
of agents who can receive only one object in the ﬁnal allocation. Such problems are very
common : allocation of rooms between roommates, lectures between professors, oﬃces
between colleagues, etc.
This class of problems was introduced by Shapley and Scarf [8]. In their model, agents
own all goods collectively. While Shapley and Scarf prove the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, Roth and Postlewaite [7] show that this competitive equilibrium is unique
when preferences are strict over the set of goods. Roth [6] proves that this unique solu-
tion can be implemented by a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. Furthermore, there is
a unique strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal allocation mechanism
leading to the unique core allocation (Ma [5]). Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1] show the
equivalence between the competitive allocation from random endowments and the random
serial dictatorship while Svensson [9] proves that all mechanisms that are strategy-proof,
nonbossy and neutral must be serially dictatorial. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2] mo-
del the case where there exists at the same time tenants and new comers on the same
market. They introduce the top trading mechanism in this set-up and show that it is Pa-
reto eﬃcient, individually rational and strategy-proof. Ehlers [4] introduces the possibility
of having weak preferences over the set of goods and shows some restrictions on agent
preferences with which eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible.1
The purpose of this paper is to look at rationalizability in the context of the house
allocation problem. In other word, I am interested in answering the following question :
is it possible to say if, for a given set of allocations, there is a preference proﬁle which
supports this set as a Paretian allocation set ? In existing papers on the house allocation
problem, only the paper by Ben-Shoham, Serrano and Volij [3] mentions explicitly the
composition of the Paretian allocation set. They show that for any two allocations in the
Paretian set, there exists a sequence of allocations belonging to the Paretian set such that
they are pairwise connected, i.e. there are only two agents switching their goods and all
others stay with the same good. This means that a set with two allocations that are not
pairwise connected cannot be rationalized.
To go further on rationalizability, I need to introduce the concept of a cycle. A cycle
is a subset of allocations in which a subset of agents switch their goods according to a
speciﬁc scheme. The presence of cycles in a given set of allocations which is presumingly a
Paretian set gives us information on the potential preference proﬁles which would support
this set as a Paretian allocation set. With the concept of a cycle, I derive some conditions
regarding the number of allocations that have to belong to an allocation set in order for it
1This list of papers treating of the house allocation problem is not exhaustive.
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to be a Paretian allocation set. Also, by using cycles, I am able to say if some allocations
must belong to the set of Paretian allocations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I present the house allocation problem
and I deﬁne the concept of a cycle. Section 2.3 talks about the properties of the cycle and
Section 2.4 presents the implication of the presence of cycles in the Paretian allocation
set. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Definitions and Notations
Let N = {1, 2, ..., |N |} denote the set of agents with |N | ≥ 2. The set of goods is X ={
x1, x2, ..., x|N |
}
where all goods are diﬀerent. I deﬁne an allocation a =
(
a1, ..., ah, ..., a|N |
)
where ah ∈ X is the good allocated to agent h with ai = aj for i = j. For any set of agents
I ⊆ N and for any set of goods Y ⊆ X with |I| = |Y |, A (I, Y ) denotes the set of all
possible allocations of goods in Y to agents in I.
Agent h’s preferences are represented by a binary relation Ph which is complete, tran-
sitive and antisymmetric (strict preference). Given x1, x2 ∈ X, x1 Ph x2 means that agent
h strictly prefers x1 to x2. Also, Ph|Y = Pg|Y means agents h and g have the same prefe-
rences over the set Y . I deﬁne a proﬁle as P =
(
P1, ..., P|N |
)
and the domain of all possible
proﬁles is denoted by P (N,X).
Definition 2.1 An allocation a is Pareto optimal for a given proﬁle P if b ∈ A (N,X)
such that
bh Ph ah for at least one h ∈ N
bk Pk ak or bk = ak ∀k = 1, 2, ..., n
I denote by PO (P ) the set of all Paretian allocations when the proﬁle is P . Then,
PO (P ) must be an element of A (N,X) which is the set of all non-empty subsets of
A (N,X). It is important to note here that, for all preference proﬁles P , the set PO (P ) is
never empty. This means that, for every preference proﬁle P , there is at least one allocation
which is not Pareto dominated by another allocation.
I say that a set T is rationalizable if there is a preference proﬁle P such that the
Paretian allocation set for P is T , i.e. T = PO (P ).
The interesting question is : under which conditions can a set T be rationalizable ? If
there are few goods, it could be possible to infer directly if there exists a proﬁle supporting
the set. But when the number is higher than 4, the direct inference is quite complicated.2
Consequently, another way must be found to solve the problem.
Before doing so, I must deﬁne some concepts. The ﬁrst concept I introduce is the cycle.
2The numbers of preference proﬁles with 4 goods is given by (4!)4 = 331776.
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Definition 2.2 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y be a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let
i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y . I
say that a set T ⊆ A (N,X) has a cycle C (i, y) if ∃S = {a1, a2, ..., a|I|} ⊆ T such that
a1i1 = y1, a
1
i2 = y2, ... a
1
i|I| = y|I|
a2i1 = y2, a
2
i2 = y3, ... a
2
i|I| = y1
...
a
|I|−1
i1
= y|I|−1, a
|I|−1
i2
= y|I|, ... a
|I|−1
i|I| = y|I|−2
a
|I|
i1
= y|I|, a
|I|
i2
= y1, ... a
|I|
i|I| = y|I|−1
For example, if the set T has the cycle C ((1, 2, 3) , (x1, x2, x3)), this means there are
three allocations a1, a2 and a3 in T such that
a11 = x1, a
1
2 = x2, a
1
3 = x3
a21 = x2, a
2
2 = x3, a
2
3 = x1
a31 = x3, a
3
2 = x1, a
3
3 = x2
It is important to underline that i and y respectively are vectors and not subsets of
N and Y respectively. To illustrate the importance of this distinction, consider the two
following sets :
T1 = {(x1, x2, x3) , (x2, x3, x1) , (x3, x1, x2)}
T2 = {(x2, x1, x3) , (x1, x3, x2) , (x3, x2, x1)}
The set T1 has the cycle C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x2, x3)) and T2 the cycle C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x3, x2)).
But those two cycles are diﬀerent. For this reason, vectors must be used to deﬁne a cycle.
Also, it should be noted that it is possible to write the same cycle in many ways.
Lemma 2.1 gives the number of ways to write the same cycle. Before presenting Lemma
2.1, I need the modulo operator. Let N be the natural number set. For a, b ∈ N, modab is
the remainder of the division of b by a.
Lemma 2.1 Any cycle of |I| elements can be written in (|I| − |R|I||)|I|2 ways where
R|I| = {r ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I| − 1} | ∃q ∈ {1, 2, ..., |I| − 1} with mod|I|rq = 0}
Proof. Suppose the set T has a cycle C(i, y) with i = (1, 2, ..., |I|) and y = (x1, x2, ...x|I|).
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Then, the set T contains |I| allocations such that :
a11 = x1, a
1
2 = x2, ... a
1
|I| = x|I|
a21 = x2, a
2
2 = x3, ... a
2
|I| = x1
...
a
|I|
1 = x|I|, a
|I|
2 = x1, ... a
|I|
|I| = x|I|−1
I can write this cycle by using y′ = (x2, x3, ..., x|I|, x1). Then, all cycles C(i, y′) with
y′ which has its components switching neighbor to neighbor relative to y give the same
cycle. This gives |I| diﬀerent ways to write the same cycle. I can do the same thing by
switching elements of i and I ﬁnd also |I| ways to write the cycle.
Now, consider the number ρ which is a positive integer strictly lower than |I|. Suppose
ρ does not belong to R, i.e. there are no pairs of positive integers q, s which are strictly
lower such that ρq = s|I|. Let i′′ = (1, ρ + 1,mod|I| (2ρ) + 1, ...,mod|I| ((|I| − 1)ρ) + 1)
and y′′ =
(
x1, xρ+1, xmod|I|(2ρ)+1, ..., xmod|I|((|I|−1)ρ+1)
)
and consider the cycle C(i′′, y′′).
Since ρ does not belong to R, this means all components of i′′ and y′′ are diﬀerent. So, the
cycle C(i′′, y′′) is the same as C(i, y). This is true for all ρ’s which are positive integers
strictly lower than |I| and do not belong to R.
Finally, I obtain
(|I| −R|I|) |I|2.
The following example illustrates this fact.
Example 2.1 Suppose I have the set T = {(x1, x2, x3) , (x2, x3, x1) , (x3, x1, x2)}. Then,
by Lemma 2.1, there are 18 ways to write the cycle :
C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x2, x3)) C ((1, 2, 3), (x2 , x3, x1)) C ((1, 2, 3), (x3 , x1, x2))
C ((2, 3, 1), (x1 , x2, x3)) C ((2, 3, 1), (x2 , x3, x1)) C ((2, 3, 1), (x3 , x1, x2))
C ((3, 1, 2), (x1 , x2, x3)) C ((3, 1, 2), (x2 , x3, x1)) C ((3, 1, 2), (x3 , x1, x2))
C ((3, 2, 1), (x3 , x2, x1)) C ((3, 2, 1), (x2 , x1, x3)) C ((3, 2, 1), (x1 , x3, x2))
C ((2, 1, 3), (x3 , x2, x1)) C ((2, 1, 3), (x2 , x1, x3)) C ((2, 1, 3), (x1 , x3, x2))
C ((1, 3, 2), (x3 , x2, x1)) C ((1, 3, 2), (x2 , x1, x3)) C ((1, 3, 2), (x1 , x3, x2))
It must be noted that |I| − |R|I|| is always higher or equal to 2 when |I| is higher or
equal to 3. The number 1 and |I| − 1 never belong to R|I|.
To simplify the presentation, I propose using the lexicographic ordering to have a
unique notation for a given cycle.
Definition 2.3 For two vectors v and w of l components, I say that v is lexicographically
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dominated by w if
w1 > v1 or
w1 = v1, w2 > v2 or
...
w1 = v1, w2 = v2, ..., wl > vl
The ﬁrst step is to choose from all possible ways of writing a given cycle the ways for
which the vector i is lexicographically dominated by (or equal to) the others. Secondly,
from those variants, I choose the one for which the component subscripts of y are lexico-
graphically dominated by the other vector y.
Let’s apply this process to the cycle in Example 2.1. The ﬁrst step tells us to se-
lect the vector i which is lexicographically dominated by the others. This vector is
(1, 2, 3). Then, from the diﬀerent ways to write the cycle with i = (1, 2, 3), which
are C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x2, x3)), C ((1, 2, 3), (x2 , x3, x1)) and C ((1, 2, 3), (x3 , x1, x2)) , I must
choose the one which has the vector y whose component subscripts are lexicographically
dominated by the component subscripts of the other y’s. I ﬁnd that the unique solution
is C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x2, x3)).
Consider another example.
Example 2.2 Suppose the set T is composed of the following allocations.
a1 = (x1, x4, x2, x3)
a2 = (x3, x2, x1, x4)
a3 = (x4, x1, x3, x2)
a4 = (x2, x3, x4, x1)
Then, the set T has the cycle C (i, y) with i = (1, 3, 2, 4) and the vector y =
(x1, x2, x4, x3).
Now, I can answer an interesting question : how many diﬀerent cycles could set T
have for a given vector of agents i and a given subset of goods Y ? There are |I|! diﬀerent
vectors i and |I|! diﬀerent possible vectors y. There are (|I|!)2 possibilities. But, I have
already shown that there are (|I| − |R|I||)|I|2 ways to write the same cycle. So there are
(|I|−1)!2
|I|−|R|I|| diﬀerent cycles for a given subset of agents I and a subset of goods Y .
I have to emphasize that the deﬁnition of a cycle is independent of what other agents
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get. For example, consider the two following sets :
T1 = {(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) , (x1, x2, x4, x5, x3) , (x1, x2, x5, x3, x4)}
T2 = {(x2, x1, x3, x4, x5) , (x2, x1, x4, x5, x3) , (x1, x2, x5, x3, x4)}
These sets have the same cycle C ((3, 4, 5) , (x3, x4, x5)) even if they do not have the
same allocations.
Let S (i, y) be the set of all allocations as such that :
asi1 = y1, a
s
i2 = y2, ..., a
s
i|I| = y|I| or
asi2 = y2, a
s
i3 = y3, ..., a
s
i|I| = y1 or
...
asi|I| = y|I|, a
s
i1 = y1, ..., a
s
i|I| = y|I|−1
Definition 2.4 Suppose that the set T ⊆ A (X,N) has a cycle C (i, y). An allocation ac ∈
T is a cycle allocation for C (i, y) if ac belongs to S (i, y). The set of all cycle allocations
for C (i, y) is denoted ST (i, y).
Then, two sets could have the same cycle while they do not have the same cycle
allocations.
Also, it is possible that a Paretian set contains more than one cycle. In particular, it
could happen that the Paretian set PO (P ) has two cycles : C (i, y) and C
(
i, y
)
with I ⊂ I
and Y ⊂ Y . To examine this case, I deﬁne the concept of subcycle.
Definition 2.5 Suppose that the set T ⊆ A (X,N) has a cycle C (i, y) where i =(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
. I say that C (is, ys) is a subcycle of C (i, y) if is =(
is1, i
s
2, ..., i
s
|Is|
)
with is1, i
s
2, ..., i
s
|Is| ∈ Is ⊂ I, ys =
(
ys1, y
s
2, ..., y
s
|Is|
)
with ys1, y
s
2, ..., y
s
|Is| ∈
Y s ⊂ Y and C (is, ys) is a cycle for ST (i, y).
Consider the next example to illustrate a subcycle.
Example 2.3 Suppose that the set T has a cycle C ((1, 2, 3, 4) , (x1, x2, x3, x4)). Then,
ST (i, y) is the set of allocations as belonging to T such that
as1 = x1, a
s
2 = x2, a
s
3 = x3, a
s
4 = x4 or
as1 = x2, a
s
2 = x3, a
s
3 = x4, a
s
4 = x1 or
as1 = x3, a
s
2 = x4, a
s
3 = x1, a
s
4 = x2 or
as1 = x4, a
s
2 = x1, a
s
3 = x2, a
s
4 = x3
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Then, this cycle contains 4 diﬀerent subcycles : C ((1, 3) , (x1, x3)), C ((1, 3) , (x2, x4)),
C ((2, 4) , (x1, x3)) and C ((2, 4) , (x2, x4))
To know if the cycle C(i, y) has subcycles, I study the set R|I|. The next lemma tells
us the condition necessary for |I| to have subcycles.
Lemma 2.2 If R|I| = {|I|}, then C(i, y) has subcycles.
Proof. Without lost of generality (WLOG), let’s take the cycle C(i, y) with i =
(1, 2, ..., |I|) and y = (x1, x2, ...x|I|).
Consider ρ which belongs to R|I| and suppose ρ is not equal to |I|. If ρ belongs to R|I|,
this means there is a positive integer q strictly lower than |I| such that mod|I|ρq = 0.
Now, let’s take i′ = (1, ρ + 1,mod|I|(2ρ) + 1, ...,mod|I|((q − 1)ρ) + 1) and y′ =
(x1, xρ+1, xmod|I|(2ρ)+1, ..., xmod|I|((q−1)ρ)+1). Since ρ is not equal to |I| and q is strictly
lower then |I|, the set I ′ is not equal to I. I obtain the cycle C(i′, y′) which is a subcycle
of C(i, y).
The following example illustrates the result of Lemma 2.2.
Example 2.4 Suppose a set T has the cycle C(i, y) with i = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and y =
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6). This means there are 6 allocations a1, ..., a6 belonging to T such
that :
a11 = x1, a
1
2 = x2, a
1
3 = x3, a
1
4 = x4, a
1
5 = x5, a
1
6 = x6
a21 = x2, a
2
2 = x3, a
2
3 = x4, a
2
4 = x5, a
2
5 = x6, a
2
6 = x1
...
a61 = x6, a
6
2 = x1, a
6
3 = x2, a
6
4 = x3, a
6
5 = x4, a
6
6 = x5
Then set R6 is given by {2, 3, 4, 6}. Take ρ = 3. Then, cycle C(i′, y′) with i′ = (1, 4)
and y′ = (x1, x4) is a subcyle of C(i, y).
The last deﬁnition concerning cycles is the following :
Definition 2.6 I say that T ⊆ A (X,N) has a complete cycle Cc (I, Y ) with I ⊆ N
and Y ⊆ X where |Y | = |I| if for all i = (i1, i2, ..., i|I|) with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y , T contains the cycle C (i, y).
In other words, there is a complete cycle Cc (I, Y ) when a set of goods are allocated
in all possible combination to a set of agents, i.e., there is a complete cycle if ∃S =
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{
a1, a2, ..., a|I|!−1, a|I|!
} ⊂ T such that
a1i = y1, a
1
j = y2, ... a
1
t = y|I|−2, a
1
u = y|I|−1, a
1
v = y|I|
a2i = y1, a
2
j = y2, ... a
2
t = y|I|−2, a
2
u = y|I|, a
2
v = y|I|−1
a3i = y1, a
3
j = y2, ... a
3
t = y|I|−1, a
3
u = y|I|−2, a
3
v = y|I|
a4i = y1, a
4
j = y2, ... a
4
t = y|I|−1, a
4
u = y|I|, a
4
v = y|I|−2
a5i = y1, a
5
j = y2, ... a
5
t = y|I|, a
5
u = y|I|−2, a
5
v = y|I|−1
a6i = y1, a
6
j = y2, ... a
6
t = y|I|, a
6
u = y|I|−1, a
6
v = y|I|−2
...
a
|I|!
i = y|I|, a
|I|!
j = y|I|−1, ... a
|I|!
t = y3, a
|I|!
u = y2, a
|I|!
v = y1
with i, j, t, u, v ∈ I.
For the deﬁnition of a complete cycle, the arguments in the function Cc (·) are sets. A
complete cycle contains all possible allocations of goods in Y between agents in I. In this
case, it is not necessary to mention a speciﬁc order of agents or goods.
It must be noted that if a set has a cycle, this does not imply that the set has a
complete cycle. This point is discussed in the next section.
2.3 Properties of cycles and complete cycles
The presence of a cycle C (i, y) in a Paretian set PO (P ) gives information about the
preferences of agents. The ﬁrst insight given by a cycle is about pairs of goods which are
neighbors in the vector y.
Proposition 2.1 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let
i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y . If
PO (P ) has a cycle C (i, y), then ∀k, l ∈ I
Pk|y|I|,y1 = Pl|y|I|,y1
and Pk|yh,yh+1 = Pl|yh,yh+1
∀h = 1, 2, 3, ..., |I| − 1.
Proof. WLOG, suppose that i = (1, 2, ..., |I|) and y = (x1, x2, ...x|I|). Consider
xh, xh+1 where h = 1, 2, ..., |I| − 1. Suppose that agent 1 prefers xh+1 to xh. Because
PO(P ) has the cycle C(i, y), there is an allocation belonging to PO(P ) such that xh+1
is allocated to agent 2 and xh to agent 1. Since this allocation belongs to PO(P ), then
agent 2 must also prefer xh+1 to xh. Again, because PO(P ) has the cycle C(i, y), there
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is an allocation belonging to PO(P ) such that xh+1 is allocated to agent 3 and xh to
agent 2. Since this allocation belongs to PO(P ), then agent 3 must prefer xh+1 to xh. If
I continue for all agents belonging to I, I ﬁnd that all agents belonging to I must have
similar preferences for all pairs xh, xh+1 with h = 1, 2, ..., |I| − 1 and for the pair x1, x|I|.
With this proposition, I get information on the proﬁle P by using the presence of a
cycle in the Paretian set. However, I only have information on preferences over each pair
(yh, yh+1) and the pair
(
y|I|, y1
)
, so I cannot make a conclusion about the preferences
over all pairs of goods belonging to the set Y . The following example demonstrates the
problem.
Example 2.5 Suppose the cycle C ((1, 2, 3, 4) , (x1, x2, x3, x4)) belongs to the Paretian set
PO (P ). Then the following proﬁle supports the cycle.
P1 P2 P3 P4
x1 x3 x1 x3
x3 x1 x3 x1
x2 x2 x2 x2
x4 x4 x4 x4
Then when the good x1 is allocated to someone who belongs to {1, 3}, the good x3 is
allocated to the other agent in that set. The cycle does not contain an allocation where the
good x1 is allocated to someone in {1, 3} and the good x3 to someone in {2, 4}. This means
that agents in {1, 3} could have diﬀerent preferences over the set {x1, x3} than agents in
{2, 4}. The same is true for the set of goods {x2, x4}.
To analyze preferences over a pair of goods which are not neighbors to each other in
the vector y, I use the concept of subcycle. In Section 2.2, I showed that a subcycle is a
cycle. So, if a cycle has subcycles, Proposition 2.1 can be used to infer agents’ preferences.
Proposition 2.2 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let i =(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y . Suppose
PO (P ) has a cycle C (i, y). Let q(r) be the smallest integer such that mod|I|(q(r)r) = 0 for
r belonging to R|I| and not equal to |I|. Then, for all pairs yα, yα+r with α = 1, 2, ..., |I|−r,
Pi1 |{yα,yα+r} = Pi[mod|I|(βr)]+1|{yα,yα+r} β = 1, 2, ..., q(r) − 1
Pi2 |{yα,yα+r} = Pi[mod|I|(βr)]+2|{yα,yα+r} β = 1, 2, ..., q(r) − 1
...
Pir |{yα,yα+r} = Pi[mod|I|(βr)]+r |{yα,yα+r} β = 1, 2, ..., q(r) − 1
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Proof. WLOG, suppose that i = (1, 2, ..., |I|) and y = (x1, x2, ...x|I|). Let q(r) be
the smallest integer such that, for r ∈ R|I|, mod|I|(q(r)r) = 0. If r belongs to R|I|
and is not equal to |I|, then for every γ = 1, 2, ..., r and every β = 1, 2, ..., q(r) − 1,
the cycle C(is, ys) with is = (γ, γ + r, γ + mod|I|(2r), ..., γ + mod|I|((q − 1)r)) and
ys =
(
xβ, xβ+r, xβ+mod|I|(2r), ..., xβ+mod|I|((q−1)r)
)
is a subcyle of C(i, y). Because C(is, ys)
is a subcycle of C(i, y), PO(P ) must have the cycle C(is, ys). I can then apply Proposition
2.1.
Let’s apply this proposition to the following example.
Example 2.6 Suppose PO(P ) has a cycle C(i, y) with i = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and y =
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6). Then, this means there are six allocations a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 ∈
PO(P ) such that
a11 = x1, a
1
2 = x2, ... a
1
6 = x6
a21 = x2, a
2
2 = x3, ... a
2
6 = x1
a31 = x3, a
3
2 = x4, ... a
3
6 = x2
a41 = x4, a
4
2 = x5, ... a
4
6 = x3
a51 = x5, a
5
2 = x6, ... a
5
6 = x4
a61 = x6, a
6
2 = x1, ... a
6
6 = x5
Then, if I take r = 3 and q = 2, I get
a11 = x1, a
1
4 = x4
a41 = x4, a
4
4 = x1
I obtain that agents 1 and 4 have same preferences over the {x1, x4}. I can continue this
way and I ﬁnd that
1. Agents in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x2}, {x2, x3},
{x3, x4}, {x4, x5}, {x5, x6} and {x1, x6}.
2. Agents in {1, 3, 5} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x3}, {x2, x4}, {x3, x5},
{x4, x6}, {x1, x5} and {x2, x6}.
3. Agents in {2, 4, 6} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x3}, {x2, x4}, {x3, x5},
{x4, x6}, {x1, x5} and {x2, x6}.
4. Agents in {1, 4} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x4}, {x2, x5} and {x3, x6}.
5. Agents in {2, 5} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x4}, {x2, x5} and {x3, x6}.
6. Agents in {3, 6} have the same preferences over sets {x1, x4}, {x2, x5} and {x3, x6}.
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This result gives additional information about the proﬁle P since it provides informa-
tion on preferences over pairs of goods which are not neighbors in the cycle. Subcycles
can be analysed on their own since they are themselves distinct cycles, but they could
be supported by diﬀerent preference proﬁles across agents than the larger cycle. However,
by using subcycles, I can only show that agents which are neighbors in a subcycle have
the same preferences over all pairs of goods which are neighbor in this subcycle and it is
possible that two distinct subsets of agents in the cycle hold diﬀerent preferences over the
same subset of goods.
While Proposition 2.2 gives us information about preferences over pairs of goods that
are neighbors in a subcycle, Proposition 2.3 deals with the other pairs.
Proposition 2.3 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let
i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y .
Suppose that PO (P ) has a cycle C (i, y). For all pairs of goods yα, yβ ∈ Y with β > α
such that (β − α) does not belong to R|I|,
Pk|{yα,yβ} = Pl|{yα,yβ} ∀k, l ∈ I
Proof. WLOG, suppose that i = (1, 2, ..., |I|) and y = (x1, x2, ...x|I|). Now, take xα
and xβ with α = 1, 2, ..., |I| − 1 and β = α+1, ..., |I| and let δ = β − α. By assumption, δ
does not belong to the set R|I|
Suppose that xα P1 xβ. Because PO(P ) has the cycle C(i, y), there is an allocation
belonging to PO(P ) such that xα is allocated to agent δ + 1 and xβ to agent 1. Since
this allocation belongs to PO(P ), then agent δ + 1 must prefer xα to xβ. Again, because
PO(P ) has the cycle C(i, y), there is an allocation belonging to PO(P ) such that xα is
allocated to agent mod|I| (2δ) + 1 and xβ to agent δ + 1. Since this allocation belongs to
PO(P ), then agent mod|I| (2δ) + 1 must prefer xα to xβ .
I can continue until I show that
xα Pγ xβ γ = 1, δ + 1,mod|I| (2δ) + 1, ...,mod|I| ((|I| − 1)δ) + 1
Since there is no positive integer q < |I| such that mod|I|(δq) = 0, then the set
{1, δ+1,mod|I| (2δ)+1, ...,mod|I| ((|I| − 1)δ)+1} has |I| elements. So all agents belonging
to I have the same preferences over the set {xα, xβ}.
It must be noted that if |I| is a prime number, all pairs of goods are treated by
Proposition 2.3 since R|I| = {|I|}. In this case, all agents in I have the same preferences
over the set Y .
Corollary 2.1 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y be a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let
i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y . If
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PO (P ) has a cycle C (i, y) and |I| is a prime number, then ∀k, l ∈ I,
Pk|Y = Pl|Y
Proof. I apply Proposition 2.3 for all pairs of goods yh, yh′ ∈ Y .
This result is very strong. With only one cycle, I can conclude that a subset of agents
have the same preferences over a subset of goods. Unfortunately, as I have showed above,
I can not extend this result to any number of individuals in I.
Another case can lead to the conclusion that agents in a subset of N have the same
preferences over a subset of goods.
Proposition 2.4 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y be a subset of X with |Y | = |I|.
Let i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y .
If PO (P ) has a complete cycle Cc (I, Y ), the agents in I have the same preferences over
Y.
Proof. Suppose the opposite is true, i.e. there exists i, j ∈ I and x′, x′′ ∈ y such that
x′ Pi x′′
x′′ Pj x′
This means the good x′ will never be allocated to j when the good x′′ is allocated to
i. That contradicts the existence of a complete cycle.
The presence of a complete cycle gives us more information about agent preferences.
In fact, a cycle could give the same information if the number of elements in that cycle is a
prime number. Unless it has this characteristic, a cycle by itself does not give information
on preferences over all goods. But, if a single cycle cannot give the same information than
a complete cycle, many cycles can provide it.
Proposition 2.5 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y a subset of X with |Y | = |I|.
Let i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈
Y . Let α be the lowest prime number except 1 such that modα|I| = 0. If PO (P ) has[( |I|
α − 1
)
∗ (|I| − 2)! + 1
]
cycles with same i and same Y , then the agents in I have the
same preferences over Y.
Proof. Suppose |I| is prime. By Corollary 2.1, if PO(P ) has a cycle C(i, y), then all
agents have the same preferences over the set Y .
Now, suppose |I| is not a prime number and let α be the smallest prime number such
that modα(|I|) = 0.
Suppose x1, x2 ∈ Y . Let I1 and I2 be two non-empty subsets of I such that all agents
belonging to I1 prefer goods x1 to x2 and all agents belonging to I2 prefer goods x2 to x1.
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Suppose PO(P ) has τ cycles C(i, yt) for t = 1, 2, ..., τ . By convention, yt1 = x1 for all
t. For all cycles C(i, yt), I deﬁne βt the positions of x2 in the vector yt so that ytβ = x2,
and let δt = βt − 1.
By Proposition 2.3, if there is a t such that δt does not belong to R|I|, then all agents
must have the same preferences. Suppose δt belongs to R|I| for all t. Let the set Π be equal
to {α, 2α, ..., |I| − α} which is a subset of R|I|.
The maximum number such that all δt belong to Π is
( |I|
α − 1
)
(|I| − 2)!. If τ =( |I|
α − 1
)
(|I| − 2)!, then there is at least one cycle C(i, yt) with δt = α. By Proposition
2.2, then agents belonging to the same set j, j + α, 1 + 2α, ..., j + (|I| − α) for j = 1, 2, ..., α
have the same preferences. But, agents in diﬀerent subsets could have diﬀerent preferences.
If I add another cycle C(i, yθ), then δθ does not belong to Π. If δθ does not
belong to R|I|, by Proposition 2.3, all agents must have the same preferences over
{x1, x2}. If δθ belongs to R|I|, by Proposition 2.1, for h = 1, 2, ..., δθ , agents belonging to
h, h + δθ, 1 +mod|I|(2δθ), ..., h + (|I| − δθ) have the same preferences. Since δθ does not be-
long to Π, then h and h+δθ does not belong to the same set j, j + α, 1 + 2α, ..., j + (|I| − α)
for j = 1, 2, ..., α. So the two sets which contain agent h and h + δθ must have the same
preferences. I can continue to conclude that all agents must have the same preferences.
To illustrate the idea of this proof, consider the following example. Suppose |X| =
|N | = 6 and suppose T has the following cycles :
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x2, , x3, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x2, , x4, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x2, , x5, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x2, , x6, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x3, , x2, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x4, , x2, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x5, , x2, ))
– the 6 cycles given by C ((1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), (x1 , , x6, , x2, ))
If T has only these cycles, this means agents 1, 3 and 5 could have diﬀerent preferences
over x1, x2 than agents 2, 4 and 6. To have all agents with the same preferences, I must
add at least one more cycle.
2.4 Cycles and Paretian sets
An interesting question concerning the composition of the Paretian set is what happens
to the remaining agents. If the Paretian set has a cycle C (i, y), it is interesting to know
if there is an allocation in A (NI,XY ) such that agents outside the cycle get the
same goods in all allocations which can constitute the cycle. In other words, if I deﬁne
Y c = XY , Ic = NI, the question is : “Is there a z ∈ A (Ic, Y c) such that the set
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composed by all allocations belonging to PO(P ) where agents in Ic get z has the cycle
C (i, y) ?” The answer is : I cannot guarantee the existence of such an element. Take the
following example :
Example 2.7 Suppose the preferences for 6 agents are given by
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
x1 x1 x1 x1 x6 x6
x3 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4
x2 x4 x2 x4 x5 x5
x4 x2 x5 x5 x1 x1
x5 x5 x4 x2 x3 x3
x6 x6 x6 x6 x4 y2
Then
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) ∈ PO(P )
(x2, x3, x4, x1, x5, x6) /∈ PO(P )
(x3, x4, x1, x2, x5, x6) ∈ PO(P )
(x4, x1, x2, x3, x5, x6) ∈ PO(P )
and
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x6, x5) ∈ PO(P )
(x2, x3, x4, x1, x6, x5) ∈ PO(P )
(x3, x4, x1, x2, x6, x5) /∈ PO(P )
(x4, x1, x2, x3, x6, x5) ∈ PO(P )
I obtain a cycle C (i, y) with i = (1, 2, 3, 4) and y = (x1, x2, x3, x4). But the subset of
PO(P ) in which allocations give x5 to agent 5 and x6 to agent 6 does not contain the cycle
C (i, y). This is also true for the subset of PO(P ) in which allocations give x6 to agent 5
and x5 to agent 6.
Example 2.7 shows that the existence of such elements is not guaranteed. Nevertheless
if it exists and the agents in I have the same preferences over the set Y , the Paretian set
contains a complete cycle Cc (I, Y ).
Proposition 2.6 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y a subset of X with |Y | = |I|. Let
i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y .
Suppose that all agents in I have the same preferences over the set Y . If the subset of
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PO (P ) composed of allocations in which agents belonging to Ic get z ∈ A (Ic, Y c) has the
cycle C (i, y), then PO (P ) has a complete cycle Cc (I, Y ) in which Ic get z.
Proof. WLOG, suppose that Y = {x1, x2, ..., x|I|−1, x|I|}. Let the set Y c be equal
to XY = {x|I|+1, x|I|+2, ..., x|N |−1, x|N |}, I {1, 2, ..., |I| − 1, |I|} and Ic = NI. By
construction, Ic = {|I|+ 1, |I|+ 2, ..., |N | − 1, |N |}.
Now suppose that a /∈ PO (P ) where agents in I get goods in the allocation ai ∈
A (I, Y ) and agents in Ic get goods in z. This means there exists an allocation b ∈ A (X, I)
such that
bi Pi ai for at least one i
bj Pj aj or bj = aj j = 1, 2, ..., |N |
Figure 2.1 illustrates the allocation a.

y1
...
yg
...
yh
...
yk


z1
...
zg
...
zh
...
zk

Fig. 2.1 – Allocation z and the cycle C (i, y)
There are three possible cases for the allocation b. The ﬁrst case consists of a reallo-
cation between agents in Ic. 
y1
...
yg
...
yh
...
yk


z1
...
zg
...
zh
...
zk

Fig. 2.2 – Allocation z : ﬁrst case
But this kind of reallocation can not Pareto dominate the allocation a because there
exists an allocation a˜ belonging to the Paretian set in which agents belonging to Ic get z.
If a reallocation between agents in Ic dominates a, then the allocation a˜ should not belong
to PO (P ).
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The second case is a reallocation between agents in I.
y1
...
yg
...
yh
...
yk


z1
...
zg
...
zh
...
zk

Fig. 2.3 – Allocation z : second case
Again, it is not possible for this new allocation to dominate the allocation a. I assume
that all agents in I have the same preferences over goods in Y . Then no reallocation
between agents in I could Pareto dominate the allocation a.
Finally, the last possibility is a reallocation between agents in both sets.
y1
...
yg
...
yh
...
yk


z1
...
zg
...
zh
...
zk

Fig. 2.4 – Allocation z : third case a
Because the agents in I have the same preferences, y1 is preferred to yk by all agents
in I.
Suppose the agent who gets y1 in the new allocation is agent α. Because of the cycle,
there is an allocation in this cycle such that α gets good yk. Then this allocation could
not be in the Paretian set because this allocation will be dominated.
yk
...
•
...
•
...
•


z1
...
zg
...
zh
...
zk

Fig. 2.5 – Allocation z : third case b
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This means that the allocation where α gets yk is Pareto dominated and contradicts
the existence of a cycle C (Y, I) in the set S.
To illustrate the proposition consider the case where the Paretian set PO(P ) contains
the allocations (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), (x2, x3, x1, x4, x5) and (x3, x1, x2, x4, x5). Then, PO(P )
has the cycle C ((1, 2, 3), (x1 , x2, x3)). By Proposition 6, the allocations (x1, x3, x2, x4, x5),
(x2, x1, x3, x4, x5) and (x3, x2, x1, x4, x5) must also belong to PO(P ). Then, PO(P ) has a
complete cycle Cc ({1, 2, 3}, {x1 , x2, x3}).
Before presenting some constraints on the number of allocations in the Paretian set, I
need the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7 Let the set I be a subset of N and Y be a subset of X with |Y | = |I|.
Let i =
(
i1, i2, ..., i|I|
)
with i1, i2, ..., i|I| ∈ I and y =
(
y1, y2, ..., y|I|
)
with y1, y2, ..., y|I| ∈ Y .
Suppose PO(P ) has a cycle C(i, y). Let δ be an agent belonging to I and xγ an element of
Y . If all agents belonging to I{δ} have the same preferences over the set Y {xγ}, then
agents belonging to I have same preferences over Y {xγ}.
Proof. For all pairs of goods belonging to Y {xγ}, I can apply Proposition 2.2 or Pro-
position 2.3 to ﬁnd that there is at least one agent belonging to I{δ} with the same
preferences as δ. Because all agents belonging to I{δ} have the same preferences over
Y {xγ}, then all agents belonging to I have the same preferences over Y {xγ}.
The next proposition describes the restrictions on the number of allocations PO(P )
must contain.
Proposition 2.8 If |N | ≥ 3 and PO (P ) = A (N,X), then |PO (P )| ≤ (|N | − 1) ∗
(|N | − 1)! ∀P . If |PO (P )| = (|N | − 1) ∗ (|N | − 1)!, then there exist an agent i and a good
xl belonging to X such that there is no allocation ah belonging to PO (P ) with ahi = xl
and the preference proﬁle is given by
1. Pg|Y = Ph|Y ∀g, h ∈ N Y = X\ {xl}
2. Pg|X = Ph|X ∀g, h ∈ N\ {i}
3. Pg|{xl,xk} = Pi|{xl,xk} ∀g ∈ N\ {i} for some xk ∈ X\ {xl}
Proof. Let Ψ = APO (P ). By assumption, |Ψ| ≤ (n− 1)!.
Step 1 : Consider the good x1. Suppose that agent 1 gets good x1 the least often in
the allocations belonging to Ψ. Then, the number of allocations in Ψ where agent 1 gets
x1 is less than
(|N | − 1)!
|N |
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which is strictly lower than (|N | − 2)!. This means there is at least one cycle C(i, y) with
i = (2, 3, ..., |N |) and Y = ({x2, x3, ..., x|N |} since there are exactly (|N | − 2)! of such
cycles.
Now take x2. Again WLOG, suppose that x2 is the good which is the least assigned
to agent 2 in the set Ψ when good x1 is assigned to agent 1. The number of allocations in
this case is less than
(|N | − 2)!
(|N | − 1)
which is strictly lower than (|N | − 3)!. This means there is at least one cycle C(i, y) with
i = (3, ..., |N |) and Y = ({x3, ..., x|N |} since there are exactly (|N | − 3)! of such cycles.
I can continue until |N |− t−1 is a prime number. Let xα belong to {xt, xt+1, ..., x|N |}
and suppose that agent α gets good xα the most often in the allocations belonging to
PO(P ) when x1 is allocated to agent 1, x2 to agent 2, ..., xt−1 to agent t − 1. Then, by
Corollary 2.1, all agents who belong to {t, t + 1, ..., |N |}{α} have the same preferences
over the set
{
xt, xt+1, ..., x|N |
}
 {xα}.
Step 2 : Now, consider the general case where agents in {s, s+ 1..., |N |}β have
the same preferences over
{
xs, xs+1, xs+2, ..., x|N |
}
 {xβ}. But there is at least one
cycle C(i, y) with i = (s, s+ 1, ..., |N |) and Y = {xs, xs+1, xs+2, ..., x|N |}. By Pro-
position 2.7, all agents belonging to I must have the same preferences over the set{
xs, xs+1, xs+2, ..., x|N |
}
 {xβ}.
Step 3 : I can use the same approach with the two remaining xα. Doing so, I ﬁnd
that all agents belonging to {s, s+ 1, ..., |N |} have the same preferences over the set{
xs, xs+1, xs+2, ..., x|N |
}
.
I use this approach until I ﬁnd that all agents belonging to {2, 3, ..., |N |} have the same
preferences over the set
{
x2, x3, ..., x|N |
}
.
Step 4 : If |Ψ| is strictly lower than (|N | − 1)!, this means there is at least one cycle
C(i, y) with i = (1, 2, ..., |N |) and Y = {x1, x2, ..., x|N |}. Then, by Proposition 2.7, all
agents have the same preferences over the set
{
x2, x3..., x|N |
}
. Now, if steps 1 to 3 are
done once again with x2 and x3 instead of x1, it can be seen that all agents must have the
same preferences over the set
{
x1, x2, x3..., x|N |
}
.
Step 5 : Now suppose that |Ψ| is equal to (|N | − 1)!. Suppose that there are two
allocations a1 and a2 belonging to Ψ such that all agents get diﬀerent goods, there is no
α ∈ {1, 2, ..., |N |} such that a1α = a2α.
Let the vector i be the cycle of goods from a1 to a2. In other words, the good allocated to
agent iα in the allocation a1 goes to agent iα+1. Since there are two allocations composing
the same cycle C(i, y) and there are (|N | − 1)! allocations, this means there is at least one
cycle and I obtain that all agents must have the same preferences.
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The only way to avoid the possibility of having a cycle of N elements in the set PO(P )
is for all allocations belonging to Ψ, there is a good which is never allocated to an agent.
Suppose this good is xγ and the agent never getting xγ in PO(P ) is δ. Since all
allocations belong to PO(P ), all agents have the same preferences over the set X {xγ}
and all agents belonging to I{δ} have the same preferences over the set X.
If all agents have the same preferences, then PO(P ) must contain all allocations. So,
this means there is at least one good belonging to X {xγ} for which agent δ and other
agents must have diﬀerent preferences.
I can use cycles to describe the rationalizability conditions of a set further. For example,
I can use the same approach to say that if |PO (P )| < (|N | − 1) (|N | − 1)!, then
1. |PO (P )| = (|N | − 2) (|N | − 1)! + (|N | − 2)! or
2. |PO (P )| ≤ (|N | − 2) (|N | − 1)!
2.5 Conclusion
The rationalizability in the context of house allocation is hard to provide. Except
in cases where there are only a few allocations (1, 2 or 3) or for the set of all possible
allocations, it is very diﬃcult to conclude.
The use of cycles can help to analyze the rationalizability of an allocation set. While
Proposition 2.8 studies the number of elements necessary for an allocation set to be ratio-
nalizable, Proposition 2.6 presents a case where the fact that a set contains a cycle implies
that it must contain some speciﬁc allocations too. Proposition 2.8 could be extended to
include more conditions, but to devise a complete statement of all cases promises to be
very long and complicated. From my point of view, the most interesting avenue for the use
of cycles is to employ them like I do in Proposition 2.6. In short, cycles can be useful to
study directly the rationalizability of an allocation set, since by using cycles it is possible
to say if a given allocation set is missing some allocations to be rationalizable.
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Chapitre 3
Self-enforcing contracts, value
functions and CARA utility
functions with an application to
mergers
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3.1 Introduction
Why do ﬁrms merge ? Two strands of the economic literature try to answer this ques-
tion. Since the beginning of the 80’s, Industrial Organization economists have tried to ﬁnd
a simple model to explain why ﬁrms merge. In their paper, Salant et al [17] show that
under a quantity-competition framework, unless synergies are important or a majority of
ﬁrms are involved (more than 80 percent of ﬁrms), merged ﬁrms (insiders) lose while other
ﬁrms (outsiders) gain.1 Deneckere and Davidson [3] state clearly the problem.
The incentive to merge in noncooperative oligopoly models depends on the in-
teraction of two basic forces. First, a merger allows coalition partners to absorb
a negative externality. (...) Second, the merger elicits a spiral of responses from
rival ﬁrms. (...) In quantity-setting games, (...) the response of other industry
members tends to hurt coalition partners because in these games reaction func-
tions are typically downward sloping.2
Some authors have proposed alternative approaches. Kamien and Zang [11] present a
three-stage model. The ﬁrst stage is the acquisition phase where ﬁrms bid to acquire other
ﬁrms. In the second stage, merged ﬁrms (the parent ﬁrm) decide how many divisions (old
independent ﬁrms) will produce a strictly positive quantity of goods. In the last stage,
divisions of every parent ﬁrm compete in a Cournot game. This approach diﬀers from
the Salant et al [17] model. Implicitly, Salant et al [17] assume that all ﬁrms involved
in a merger act post-merger as a unique entity. With their model, Kamien and Zang
[11] ﬁnd that 50 percent of market ﬁrms must be involved in the merger to gain from
the merger. Creane and Davidson [2]3 continue in the same way and propose a model in
which the parent ﬁrm can use a diﬀerent strategy with their divisions. They show that the
merger could be beneﬁcial if the parent ﬁrm uses a structure in which divisions announce
sequentially the quantity they will produce. This Stackelberg game, which is played by
divisions in combination with a Cournot game with the other ﬁrms, leave insiders with
a gain and outsiders with a loss. Moreover, they ﬁnd that only a small number of ﬁrms
must be involved in the merger. They argue that other kind of strategies can be used to
increase the market power of the merging ﬁrm. As such, they provide an answer to the
merger paradox.4
Finance Economists have also studied mergers. They use ﬁnancial incentives to study
conditions under which a merger could be beneﬁcial to insiders.5 While some authors look
1Deneckere and Davidson [3] work on a price competition model. They ﬁnd that both insiders and
outsiders gain but outsiders do better than insiders.
2Deneckere and Davidson [3], page 484.
3Huck, Konrad and Mu¨ller [9] present similar models with same results.
4Pepall, Richards and Norman [16] deﬁne the merger paradox as the diﬃculty to construct a simple
economic model which leaves insiders with a gain even if they do not merge in a monopoly.
5Hubbard [8] gives a survey of the literature on ﬁnancial constraints.
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at the management incentives,6 one of the most important approach relates to the opti-
mality of using internal ﬁnancing versus external ﬁnancing. In a frictionless capital market
framework, Modiglani and Miller [15] show that the capital structure (internal or external
ﬁnancing) of ﬁrms does not aﬀect a ﬁrm market value. But some economists argue that
the equivalence between internal versus external ﬁnancing does not hold. Alchian [1] and
Williamson [20] were the ﬁrst to argue that headquarters are able to monitor produc-
tion and eﬀort more eﬀectively than outsiders. Then, mergers could be beneﬁcial if this
problem of monitoring leads to an ineﬃcient allocation of capital for pre-merger ﬁrms.
Gertner et al [7] present a model in which headquarters can use the surplus of external
capital from given project for ﬁnancing another project. They argue that this internal
capital market increases monitoring incentives, decreases entrepreneurial incentives and
redeploys ﬁnancial assets more eﬃciently. Stein [18] uses another approach. He supposes
that the headquarter is able to enact a winner-picking process which consists of the al-
location of the constrained capital to the division which provides a better return. Stein
[18] supposes that the headquarters have a better knowledge than outsider investors to
allocate more eﬀectively. Consequently, the headquarter is able to reallocate capital as the
state of nature is revealed and can reassign capital to the good project from the bad one.
Besides the question of the diﬀerence between internal and external capital, the im-
perfection of the ﬁnancial market could explain why ﬁrms merge. The risk is transferred
to the ﬁnancial market and risk-averse shareholders gain from a decrease in the net reve-
nue variance. When the ﬁnancial market is not perfect, shareholders can be better oﬀ by
merging their ﬁrm with another. If ﬁrms have negatively correlated revenues, the merger
will decrease the ﬁrm’s revenue variance by using an internal ﬁnancial market. However, if
ﬁrms have positively correlated revenues, it could happen that the increase in the revenue
variance will decrease the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial market imperfection and leave the merged
ﬁrm with a net gain.
This paper studies this question. In their paper, Inderst and Mu¨ller [10] present a model
in which a ﬁrm must decide to centralize or decentralize borrowing. With the ﬁrst option,
investors and ﬁrms can sign a ﬁnancial contract which is more eﬃcient than contracts
signed when borrowing is decentralized. Implicitly, Inderst and Mu¨ller [10] assume that
the cost to enforce a contract is quite low. So, the agent must respect the contract in
any period. When the cost of enforcing a contract is important and the mobility cost for
an agent to quit the contract is quite low, the lack of a binding commitment becomes a
problem. Indeed, one agent could have the incentive to break the ex-ante optimal contract
after the state of nature is revealed. This problem of commitment in risk-sharing contracts
can lead to ineﬃciencies. To avoid this problem, long term contracts must be self-enforcing,
which means that no agent could gain by breaking the contract in all possible contingencies.
6For example, see McNeil, Niehaus and Powers [14].
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I use this approach to study in which condition a merger could be beneﬁcial for sha-
reholders. Particularly, I want to study the eﬀects of self-enforcing constraints on the
eﬃciency of mergers. A self-enforcing contract is such that, in all possible states of nature,
the ﬁrm and the borrower must have an incentive to respect the contract. This approach
was ﬁrst introduced by Thomas and Worrall [19]. In their model, agents agree on signing
an insurance contract at time 0. Then, at the beginning of each subsequent period, the
state of nature is revealed to both agents. Each agent must decide whether to respect the
contract or not. If both of them decide to respect the contract, then the transfer of wealth
occurs along the terms speciﬁed in the contract. If one decides to break the contract, then
no wealth is transferred and it is not possible for the agent to sign another contract in the
future. If a given contract, which can be viewed as a series of transfers, is such that in any
state of nature and for any period, each agent gains more in respecting the contract than
in breaking it, then this contract is said to be self-enforcing.
Since general results are hard to provide, I study the case where utility functions exhibit
constant relative risk aversion (CARA). I begin by explicitly solving the self-enforcing
contract problem when agents have CARA utility functions and there are two states of
nature. From the optimal solution, I am able to draw the Pareto frontier in the context
where ﬁrst-best contracts are feasible and when there is no such feasible contract. Second,
I look at the eﬀects of a change in the distribution of the random revenue on the optimal
contract. I show that an increase in the variance leads to an increase of the range of the
discount factor for which the optimal contract is non trivial. Finally, I ﬁnd that a merger
may or may not be beneﬁcial for merged ﬁrms depending on the discount rate and the
correlation between ﬁrm’s revenues.
The paper is divided as follows. In Section 3.2, I present the model which is then solved
explicitly with CARA utility functions in Section 3.3. I analyze the eﬀect of a change in
the variance of revenues in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, I study the beneﬁt of a merger in
the self-enforcing context. Section 3.6 provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Model
The problem is to design an insurance contract between two inﬁnitely-lived risk-averse
agents. I suppose that the state of the economy is i.i.d. over the ﬁnite set S = {1, 2, ..., |S|}.
The revenue of agent 1 can take values y1, ..., yS while agent 2 has a constant revenue w.
By convention, ys > ys−1. I denote by yt the realization of agent 1’s revenue in period t.
The utility functions for agents 1 and 2 are respectively u(c1t ) and v(c
2
t ) where c
i
t is
the consumption of agent i in period t. I suppose that the utility functions are twice
continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. Total consumption must satisfy c1t + c
2
t ≤
yt + w for any yt ∈ {y1, y2, ..., y|S|}.
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Let ht = (s1, s2, s3, ..., st−1) be the history of realized states of the world at period t.
The insurance contract δ consists of a series of transfers which in any given period depend
on the history and the current state of the world. Let bt (ht, s) be the transfer from agent
1 to agent 2 in period t when the history is ht and the state of nature at period t is s. The
transfer could be positive or negative. Consumption in period t can then be expressed as
function of the revenue and the transfer (c1t = ys − bt (ht, s) and c2t = w + bt (ht, s)).
Now, let Ets be the operator expectation over s conditional on ht−1 and let β be the
discount rate. I deﬁne U (δ;ht) and V (δ;ht) as the expected net gain for all periods
t, t+ 1, t + 2, ... for agents 1 and 2 respectively,
U (δ;ht) = Ets
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t [u (ys − bτ (hτ , s))− u (ys)]
]
V (δ;ht) = Ets
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t [v (w + bτ (hτ , s))− v (w)]
]
An optimal contract is a contract δ such that agent 1 maximizes his expected utility
when agent 2 obtains a given level of expected utility. This optimal contract is the solution
which maximizes :
U (δ, h1) = E1s [u (ys − b1 (h1, s))− u (ys) + βU (δ, h2)] (3.1)
subject to
V (δ, h1) = E1s [v (w + b1 (h1, s))− v (w) + βV (δ, h2)] ≥ V
where V is the reservation value of agent 2.
The solution to the maximization problem (3.1) is ﬁrst-best. This contract is such that
u′
(
c1t
)
/v′
(
c2t
)
is constant for all periods t and for all states of nature s.
The ﬁrst-best contract introduces a potentially large transfer from one agent to the
other. In some circumstances, it is conceivable that an agent would prefer reneging on
the contract rather than making a transfer to the other agent. If contract enforcement is
costly, nothing can prevent an agent from doing so.
I now study this case explicitly. I suppose that each agent can leave the contract at
any moment. If an agent leaves the contract, I assume the he remains in autarky forever
thereafter. For the contract to hold, each agent must have incentives to respect the contract
in every period and for every history. To take this into account, I must add self-enforcing
constraints to the problem. The optimal self-enforcing contract is derived by solving
MAX U (δ, h1) (3.2)
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subject to
V (δ, h1) ≥ V
u (ys − bτ (hτ , s))− u (ys) + βU (δ, hτ+1) ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
v (w + bτ (hτ , s))− v (w) + βV (δ, hτ+1) ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
The additional constraints state that, in any period and state, each agent must have
a non-negative surplus from the relationship.
There always exists a self-enforcing contract. The contract where no transfer is made in
any period is trivially self-enforcing. I call this contract the trivial self-enforcing contract
(TSEC). A contract which is self-enforcing and is not the TSEC is called a non-trivial
self-enforcing contract.
Let b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st) be the ﬁrst-best transfer at period t in state st when the transfer
at period t− 1 was bt−1 and the state of nature was st−1. In other words, b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st)
is such that
u′
(
yt−1 − bt−1
)
v′ (w + bt−1)
=
u′
(
ys − b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st)
)
v′
(
w + b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st)
)
Thomas and Worrall [19] show that the optimal contract has the following characteri-
zation.
1. For any state of nature s, there exists a non-empty interval
[
bs, bs
]
such that bt (ht, s)
belongs to this interval.
2. For any history ht and state of nature s,
bt (ht, s) =

bs if bs > b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st)
b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st) if b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st) ∈
[
bs, bs
]
bs if bs < b˜t (bt−1, st−1, st)
(3.3)
The optimal contract is as close as possible to the ﬁrst-best contract subject to self-
enforcing constraints which implicitly deﬁne the set of bs and bs.
3.3 CARA utility functions
To be able to solve explicitly (3.2), I use a speciﬁc form of utility functions and add
some constraints to the problem structure. In this section, I use a constant absolute risk
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aversion (CARA) utility function, i.e.
u
(
c1t (ht, s)
)
= −e−r(c1t (ht,s))
v
(
c2t (ht, s)
)
= −e−q(c2t (ht,s))
where r and q are respectively the risk aversion parameter of agent 1 and agent 2. With
this assumption about the form of the utility function, the problem becomes :
MAX E1s
[
−e−r(y1−b1(h1,s)) + e−ry1 + βU (δ, h2)
]
(3.4)
subject to
E1s
[
−e−q(w+b1(h1,s)) + e−qw + βV (δ, h2)
]
≥ V
−e−r(ys−bτ (hτ ,s)) + e−rys + βEτs [U (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
−e−q(w+bτ (hτ ,s)) + e−qw + βEτs [V (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
It is possible to characterize ﬁrst-best contracts using simple manipulations. To do so, I
must diﬀerentiate (3.4) without the self-enforcing constraints with respect to two diﬀerent
states of nature at two diﬀerent periods.
u′ (ys − bt (ht, s))
u′ (w + bt (ht, s))
=
u′ (yz − bτ (hτ , z))
u′ (w + bτ (hτ , z))
re−r(ys−bt(ht,s))
qe−q(w+bt(ht,s))
=
re−r(yz−bτ (hτ ,z))
qe−q(w+bτ (hτ ,z))
r(ys − bt (ht, s))− q(w + bt (ht, s)) = r(yz − bτ (hτ , z))− q(w + bτ (hτ , z))
And I obtain :
bτ (hτ , z) = bt (ht, s) +
r
(r + q)
(yτz − yts) (3.5)
This gives the relation between each possible transfer in each possible state of nature
and at every period. Equation (3.5) tells us that the optimal transfer at a speciﬁc period
in a speciﬁc state of nature is linear in the revenues of both agents. Here, there are optimal
contracts for special cases.
– If agent 2 has a random revenue ws, then the ﬁrst-best contract is characterized by
bτ (hτ , z) = bt (ht, s) + r(r+q)(yz − ys) + q(r+q)(ws − wz).
– If agent 1 and agent 2 have the same risk-aversion coeﬃcient (r = q), then bτ (hτ , z) =
bt (ht, s) + 12(yz − ys).
– If agent 2 is risk neutral (q = 0), then bτ (hτ , z) = bt (ht, s) + yz − ys.
Throughout the rest of the paper, unless I explicitly suppose something else, I assume
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that agents have the same risk-aversion coeﬃcient (q = r). This facilitates the explicit
characterization of the optimal contract.7
Also, to be able to explicitly solve the problem, I constrain the number of states of
nature to two. With more states, the problem rapidly becomes intractable.
3.3.1 Conditions for a non-trivial solution
Let’s say that a contract δ′ is stationary if the transfer in state 1 is b′1 and the transfer
in state 2 is b′2, no matter what the history is. The next two lemmas are derived from
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 of Kocherlakota [12].
Lemma 3.1 If the optimal contract δ∗ is ﬁrst-best, then δ∗ is stationary.
Proof. If a contract is ﬁrst-best, then the transition of transfers between states of nature
at any period is given by (3.3). Then, the transfer at period t is b1 (ht, 1) = b∗1 if the state
of nature is 1 for any history ht and b1 (ht, 2) = b∗2 if the state of nature is 2 for any history
ht.
Lemma 3.2 If there are only two states of nature, then the optimal contract δ∗ for (3.4)
monotonically converges to a stationary contract δ′.
Proof. Let the optimal contract be δ∗. By deﬁnition, the contract δ∗ gives the appropriate
transfer for any state of nature at period 1. Suppose that transfers at period 1 are given
by b∗1 (h1, 1) and b
∗
1 (h1, 2).
Without loss of generality, lets assume the state of nature at period 1 is 1. By (3.3),
b∗1 (h1, 1) belongs to
[
b1, b1
]
and, if the state of nature is the same at period t and t + 1,
then transfers in these periods must be the same (i.e. b∗t (ht, s) = b∗t+1 (ht+1, s)). Then,
until the state of nature becomes 2, the transfer stays b∗1 (h1, 1).
Suppose that the state of nature stays 1 for period 1 to period t− 1 and becomes 2 at
period t. Then b∗t (ht, 2) must be equal
– to b2 if b2 > b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) , 2
)
;
– or to b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) , 2
)
if b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) , 2
) ∈ [b2, b2] ;
– or to b2 if b2 < b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) , 2
)
.
In case 2, this means that the contract is ﬁrst-best and by Lemma 3.1, the contract is
stable.
Suppose case 1, i.e. the transfer in state 2 is the lowest possible (b2). If I stay in state
2, then the transfer stays b2. If I return to state 1 at period τ > t, then b∗τ (hτ , 1) must be
equal :
– to b1 if b1 > b˜τ
(
b2, 1
)
;
7With diﬀerent risk-aversion coeﬃcients, I obtain a system of polynomial equations of diﬀerent degrees.
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– or to b˜τ
(
b2, 1
)
if b˜τ
(
b2, 1
) ∈ [b1, b1] ;
– or to b1 if b1 < b˜τ
(
b2, 1
)
.
In case 2, this means the contract becomes stable after period τ with b˜τ
(
b2, 1
)
in state
1 and b2.
In case 3, this means the contract become stable after period τ with b1 in state 1 and
b2
Case 1 is impossible. I have supposed that b2 > b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) , 2
)
. Then, b˜t
(
b2, 1
)
>
b∗t−1 (ht−1, 1) > b1.
By the structure of the process, the probability that the history hτ contains state 1
and state 2 while τ goes to inﬁnity is equal to one.
These results hold for any concave utility function. This comes from the fact that
transfers in each state must belong to a closed interval. Consequently, if the ﬁrst best
contract transition given by b˜t
(
b∗t−1 (ht−1, s) , z
)
belongs to the interval, then there is a
ﬁrst-best self-enforcing contract. By deﬁnition, any ﬁrst-best contract is stationary since
transfers do not depend on the history but only on the actual state of nature. For any no
ﬁrst-best self-enforcing contract, boundaries constrain the value of transfers. In the two
state case, the non-trivial self-enforcing contract (NTSEC) converges monotonically to a
stationary contract where the transfer is upper bounded in state 1 or lower bounded in
state 2.
In the case where the number of states of nature is higher than 2, the NTSEC does
not converge to a stationary contract. The reason is transfers in intermediate states of
nature (state 2, 3, ..., S − 1), it could be optimal to have history-dependent transfers. For
example, in the 3-state case, transfer in state 2 could take diﬀerent values depending of the
history. But, if I deﬁne partial history-dependent stationarity, which says that transfers in
any state depend only of the part of the history in which state 1 and S was realized, I can
obtain a lemma similar to Lemma 3.2 using partial history-dependent stationarity for any
number of states of nature.
Now, I am able to study the existence of a NTSEC. To prove the existence of such
contract, I can only look for the existence of a stationary contract which satisﬁes the self-
enforcing constraints. By Lemma 3.2, if there is a NTSEC δ∗, then this contract converges
monotonically to a stationary contract δ′. The contract δ′ which must be self-enforcing
since a self-enforcing contract must be self-enforcing in any state of nature and at any
period. Consequently, looking for the existence of a stationary self-enforcing contract is
enough to prove the existence of a NTSEC.
Proposition 3.1 Let ρ be the probability of being in the state of nature 1 and y2 > y1.
If er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−β
β2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]
, then there are some values of V for which the solution to
(3.4) is not the TSEC.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.2, each optimal contract δ∗ converges to a stable contract δ′. Then,
if δ′ is not self-enforcing, neither is δ∗.
Take δ′ and assume that this contract gives at any period b′1 if the state of nature is 1
and b′2 otherwise. Let U ′ and V ′ be the gain in utility of agent 1 and 2 respectively with
the contract δ′. Suppose that δ′ is self-enforcing. Then,
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1 + βEs
[
U ′
] ≥ 0
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2 + βEs
[
U ′
] ≥ 0
−e−r(w+b′1) + e−rw + βEs
[
V ′
] ≥ 0
−e−r(w+b′2) + e−rw + βEs
[
V ′
] ≥ 0
I have supposed that y2 > y1. This means that agent 1 is relatively more rich in state
2 than in state 1. Then, the optimal transfer must be negative in state 1 and positive in
state 2.
If I take a look at the participation constraints, I see that only two constraints are
really constraining.
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2 + βEs
[
U ′
] ≥ 0
−e−r(w+b′1) + e−rw + βEs
[
V ′
] ≥ 0
The other two are not because in those cases, the agent receives some amount. Then,
they do not want to break the contract. By deﬁnition, U ′ and V ′ are stable. I can compute
their value by using the Bellman equation.
U ′ = ρ
(
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2
)
+ βU ′
U ′ =
1
1− β
[
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2
)]
and
V ′ =
[
ρ
(
−e−rb′1 + 1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−rb′2 + 1
)]
+ βV ′
V ′ =
1
1− β
[
ρ
(
−e−rb′1 + 1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−rb′2 + 1
)]
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I replace U ′ and V ′ in the preceding constraints. Now, I must isolate b′2 in the ﬁrst
constraint.
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2 + β
1− β
[
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2
)]
≥ 0
βρ
1− β
(
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1
)
+
1− βρ
1− β
(
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2
)
≥ 0
βρ
(
−e−r(y1−b′1) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− βρ)
(
−e−r(y2−b′2) + e−ry2
)
≥ 0
βρ
(
−er(y2−y1)erb′1 + er(y2−y1)
)
+ (1− βρ)
(
−erb′2 + 1
)
≥ 0
And I obtain :
βρ
1− βρ
(
−er(y2−y1)erb′1 + er(y2−y1)
)
+ 1 ≥ erb′2
Graphically, this condition is represented by Figure 3.1.
1
1
erb
′
1
erb
′
2
(βρ)er(y2−y1)
1−βρ + 1
1−βρ
(βρ)er(y2−y1) + 1
45o
Fig. 3.1 – First Constraint
I can proceed in the same way with the second constraint.
−e−rb′1 + 1 + β
[
ρ
1− β
(
−e−rb′1 + 1
)
+
(1− ρ)
1− β
(
−e−rb′2 + 1
)]
≥ 0
−e−rb′1 + β
[
ρ
1− β
(
−e−rb′1
)
+
(1− ρ)
1− β
(
−e−rb′2
)]
≥ − 1
1− β
−e−rb′1 + β
[
ρ
1− β
(
−e−rb′1
)
+
(1− ρ)
1− β
(
−e−rb′2
)]
≥ − 1
1− β
(1− β + βρ)
(
−e−rb′1
)
+ (β − βρ)
(
−e−rb′2
)
≥ −1
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And I obtain :
1− β + βρ
β − βρ
(
−e−rb′1
)
+
1
β − βρ ≥ e
−rb′2
β − βρ
1− (1− β + βρ) (e−rb′1) ≤ erb′2
Now, I can graph this condition (See Figure 3.2)
1
1
erb
′
1
erb
′
2
β + βρ
1
1−β+βρ
45o
Fig. 3.2 – Second constraint
I know that the frontier must have the point (1, 1) since the TSEC is self-enforcing. If
I combine the two constraints, I obtain Figure 3.3.
1
1
erb
′
1
erb
′
2
45o
Fig. 3.3 – Both Constraints
The grey and hatched region is the set of all contracts like δ′. To know if there exists
such contracts, I must analyze the slope of the two constraints at the point (1, 1). Lets
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begin with the ﬁrst constraint.
d(erb
′
2)
d(erb′1)
= −βρe
r(y2−y1)
1− βρ
For the second one, I obtain :
d(erb
′
2)
d(erb′1)
=
d
d(erb′1)
(
β − βρ
1− (1− β + βρ) e−rb′1
)
d(erb
′
2)
d(erb′1)
= − β − βρ[
1− (1− β + βρ) e−rb′1]2 (1− β + βρ) e−rb′1
If I evaluate this slope at (1, 1), I obtain
d(erb
′
2)
d(erb′1)
= −(1− β + βρ)
β − βρ
In order for self-enforcing contracts other than the TSEC to exist, the slope of the
second constraint must be larger than the slope of the ﬁrst constraint.
−(1− β + βρ)
β − βρ ≥ −
βρer(y2−y1)
1− βρ
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ)
βρ (β − βρ) ≤ e
r(y2−y1)
1 +
1− β
βρ (β − βρ) ≤ e
r(y2−y1)
Then, the slope of the ﬁrst constraint is lower than the slope of the second if er(y2−y1) >
1 + 1−ββρ∗(β−βρ) .
For the moment, I do not know if the optimal contract is ﬁrst-best. Proposition 3.1
tells us only under which conditions a non-trivial solution to (3.4) exists. Proposition 3.2
gives the condition to have a self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contract.
Proposition 3.2 Let ρ be the probability of being in the state of nature 1 and y2 > y1. If
er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−β
β2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]2
, then there is some value of V such that the optimal contract
is ﬁrst-best.
Proof. Suppose that the optimal ﬁrst-best contract is bfb1 , b
fb
2 and let U
fb and V fb
be the gain in utility for agent 1 and 2 with the contract δfb. The ﬁrst-best contract is
self-enforcing if it fulﬁlls the self-enforcing constraints. In the proof of Proposition (3.1), I
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state that only two self-enforcing constraints are relevant.
−e−r(y2−bfb2 ) + e−ry2 + βEs
[
Ufb
]
≥ 0
−e−r(w+bfb1 ) + e−rw + βEs
[
V fb
]
≥ 0
By (3.5), I know that the ﬁrst-best contract is given by the following relation :
erb
fb
2 = e
r
2
(y2−y1)erb
fb
1
Let A be the NTSEC that fulﬁlls both self-enforcing constraints with equality. Then,
some ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing if A is on the left side of the ﬁrst-best contract
line. To proceed, I must ﬁnd the solutions to the equations for the constraints. Since the
TSEC satisﬁes the constraints, I must focus on the other solution (point A). Let
(
bA1 , b
A
2
)
be the values of the transfers at point A and let UA and V A be the gain in utility of agent
1 and 2 with the contract δA. Then, point A represents the non-trivial solution of
−e−r(y2−bA2 ) + e−ry2 + βEs
[
UA
]
= 0
−e−r(w+bA1 ) + e−rw + βEs
[
V A
]
= 0
In the previous proof, I have found that those equations can be written as :
βρ
1− βρ
(
−er(y2−y1)erbA1 + er(y2−y1)
)
+ 1 = erb
A
2
β − βρ
1− (1− β + βρ)
(
e−rbA1
) = erbA2
By solving this system of equations, I ﬁnd that the non-trivial solution is :
erb
A
2 =
(
βρer(y2−y1)
1− βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
erb
A
1 = 1 +
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
− (β − βρ)−
(
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
)
(β − βρ)
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If I calculate the slope of the line which connects point A to the origin, e
rbA1
erb
A
2
, I ﬁnd :
erb
A
1
erb
A
2
=
1 + 1−βρ
βρer(y2−y1) − (β − βρ)−
(
1−βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
)
(β − βρ)(
βρer(y2−y1)
1−βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
=
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
βρer(y2−y1)
1−βρ + 1− βρe
r(y2−y1)
1−βρ (β − βρ)− (β − βρ)(
βρer(y2−y1)
1−βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
=
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
 βρer(y2−y1)1−βρ + 1(
βρer(y2−y1)
1−βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
− 1

=
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
(
1
β − βρ − 1
)
Now, I must compare this result with the slope of the line of ﬁrst-best contracts. If
the slope of the ﬁrst-best contract line is lower than the slope I ﬁnd above, then some
ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing.
erb
fb
1
erb
fb
2
≥ e
rbA1
erb
A
2
1
e
r
2
(y2−y1) ≥
1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
(
1
β − βρ − 1
)
e
r
2
(y2−y1) ≥ 1− βρ
βρ
(
1− β + βρ
β − βρ
)
e
r
2
(y2−y1) ≥ 1− β + βρ− βρ+ β
2ρ− β2ρ2
βρ (β − βρ)
e
r
2
(y2−y1) ≥ 1 + 1− β
βρ (β − βρ)
Then, if er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−ββρ(β−βρ)
]2
, there exist some values of V such that the optimal
contract is ﬁrst-best.
The idea of the proof is the following : the ﬁrst-best relation given by (3.5) must be
compared with the non-trivial contract solving the two self-enforcing constraints. Precisely,
I must compare ratios e
rb
fb
1
erb
fb
2
and e
rbA1
erb
A
2
where bfbs is the transfer in state s under a ﬁrst best
contract 8 and bAs is the transfer in state s when the contract is the non-trivial one solving
self-enforcing constraints. Figure 3.4 illustrates the idea.
From the two preceding propositions, if y2−y1 increases, then the optimal contract will
become non-trivial once er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−ββρ(β−βρ)
]
and when er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−ββρ(β−βρ)
]2
,
8Mathematically, I ﬁnd that the ratio e
rb
fb
1
e
rb
fb
2
is constant for any ﬁrst-best contract.
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1
1
erb
′
1
erb
′
2
erb
fb
2 = e
r
2
(y2−y1)erb
fb
1
45o
A
Fig. 3.4 – First-Best Contracts and Constraints
then the optimal contract will become ﬁrst best. Those results can be viewed as the dual
solution from Proposition 4 of Thomas and Worrall [19] which says that there is a discount
factor β∗ such that, for all β > β∗, some optimal contracts are ﬁrst-best and there is a
β∗ < β∗ such that for all β ∈ [β∗, β∗), the optimal contract is non-trivial but not ﬁrst-best.9
I prove Proposition 3.2 by ﬁnding the condition such that a ﬁrst-best contract satisﬁes
all self-enforcing constraints. But, what can I say about the optimal contract ? Kocherla-
kota [12] proves that, when some optimal contracts are ﬁrst-best, then the expected utility
converges to a utility level given by a self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contract.10 I can rewrite this
proposition in a equivalent way in term of contracts
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that some ﬁrst-best contract is optimal. Then, all optimal
contracts converge to a ﬁrst-best contract.
Proof. See Proposition 4.1 of Kocherlakota.
I say that a contract δ is ﬁrst-best convergent if it converges to a ﬁrst-best contract.
This deﬁnition will be very useful in Section 3.5.
3.3.2 Pareto Frontier
In the previous section, I derive the condition to have a NTSEC. Here, I want to show
how the self-enforcing constraints aﬀect the optimality of the contract. To do so, I use the
Pareto frontier in either case where a ﬁrst-best contract is or is not self-enforcing and I
compare with the Pareto frontier when there is no self-enforcing constraint. I ﬁrst begin
with the Pareto frontier when there is no self-enforcing constraint.
9It is possible to write conditions to have a NTSEC or a ﬁrst-best self-enforcing contract with beta on
the left side but conditions become a bit messy
10See Proposition 4.1 of Kocherlakota [12].
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Proposition 3.4 Without self-enforcing constraints, the Pareto frontier is given by :
UU
(
V
)
=
1
1− β
Es [e−rys]− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV

with V ∈
[
0, 1
(1−β)erw
(
1− Es

e−
r
2 ys
2
Es[e−rys ]
)]
.
Proof. First, with the assumption of constant revenues for agent 2, I can rewrite the
participation constraint. By Proposition 4.1 of Kocherlakota [12], I have that V (δ, ht) = V .
Then,
Es
[
−e−r(ws+bfbs ) + e−rws + βV
]
≥ V
Es
[
−e−rbfbs + 1
]
≥ (1− β) erwV
Es
[
e−rb
fb
s
]
= 1− (1− β) erwV
I know from (3.5) that the relation between transfers is given by :
bfb2 = b
fb
1 +
1
2
(y2 − y1)
By introducing this result into the participation constraint for agent 2, I obtain :
ρ
(
e−rb
fb
1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
e−rb
fb
2
)
= 1− (1− β) erwV
ρ
(
e−rb
fb
1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
e
−r

bfb1 +
1
2
(y2−y1)

)
= 1− (1− β) erwV
e−rb
fb
1 =
1− (1− β) erwV
ρ + (1− ρ)
(
e
r
2
(y1−y2)
)
And e−rb
fb
2 is given by :
e−rb
fb
2 =
1− (1− β) erwV
ρ
(
e
r
2
(y2−y1)
)
+ (1− ρ)
Then, I am able to deﬁne the Pareto frontier explicitly by introducing bfb1 and b
fb
2 in
the utility function of agent 1.
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Ufb = Es
[
−e−r(ys−bfbs ) + e−rys + βUfb
]
Ufb =
1
1− β
[
Es
[
e−rys
]− ρe−r(y1−bfb1 ) − (1− ρ) e−r(y2−bfb2 )]
Ufb =
1
1− β
Es [e−rys]− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV

The maximum value for V is reached when Ufb = 0.
0 =
1
1− β
Es [e−rys]− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV MAX

Es
[
e−rys
]
=
Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV MAX
V MAX =
1
(1− β)erw
1− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
Es [e−rys ]

Figure 3.5 represents the unconstrained Pareto frontier when there are no self-enforcing
constraints.
V
Ufb
Es[e−rys]−Es

e−
r
2 ys
2
1−β
1
(1−β)erw
[
1− Es

e−
r
2 ys
2
Es[e−rys ]
]
Fig. 3.5 – Unconstrained Pareto Frontier
67
Without self-enforcing constraints, this Pareto frontier is attainable everywhere. This
is not the case when I add self-enforcing constraints. With self-enforcing constraints, as
shown above, there are two possibilities : either some ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing
or no ﬁrst-best contract is. In the following proposition, I present the Pareto frontier if
there is no self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contracts.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that
[
1 + 1−β
β2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]2
> er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−β
β2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]
and let
erb
A
1 = 1− β + βρ+ 1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
(1− β + βρ)
erb
A
2 =
(
βρer(y2−y1)
1− βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
V A =
(1− ρ) e−rw
1− β + βρ
(
1− e−rbA2
)
V MAX =
(1− ρ) e−rw
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
Then,
- if V ∈ [0, V A], then the optimal contract is given by :
– bt (ht, s) = bA1 if the state of nature s is 1.
– bt (ht, s) =
(1−ρ)
(1−ρ)−[1−(1−ρ)β]erwV if the history is ht = (2, 2, ..., 2).
– bt (ht, s) = bA2 otherwise.
- if V ∈ [V A, V MAX], then the optimal contract is given by :
– bt (ht, s) = bA2 if the state of nature s is 2.
– bt (ht, s) =
ρ(1−β+βρ)
ρ(1−β+βρ)+(1−ρ)

1−e−rbA2

−(1−ρβ)(1−β+βρ)∗erd∗V
if the history is ht =
(1, 1, ..., 1).
– bt (ht, s) = bA1 otherwise.
And
- if V ∈ [0, V A], then the Pareto frontier is given by :
USE
(
V
)
=
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
(1− β + βρ) (1− ρβ)
+
(1− ρ) ∗ e−ry2
(1− β + βρ)
(
1− 1− ρ
1− ρ− erw ∗ (1− β + βρ) ∗ V
)
- if V ∈ [V A, V MAX], then the Pareto frontier is given by :
USE
(
V
)
=
ρe−ry1
1− βρ
(
1− ρ (1− β + βρ)
γ
)
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where γ = ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) ∗ erwV .
Proof. By Proposition 3.1 and 3.2, I already know that there is no ﬁrst-best self-
enforcing contract. By Lemma 3.2, the optimal contract converges monotonically to the
contract given by the non-trivial solution of the following 2 self-enforcing constraints :
βρ
1− βρ
(
−er(y2−y1)erb′1 + er(y2−y1)
)
+ 1 = erb
′
2
β − βρ
1− (1− β + βρ) (e−rb′1) = erb′2
which is
erb
A
1 = 1− β + βρ + 1− βρ
βρer(y2−y1)
(1− β + βρ)
erb
A
2 =
(
βρer(y2−y1)
1− βρ
)
(β − βρ) + (β − βρ)
Graphically,
1
1
erb
′
1
erb
′
2
erb
fb
2 = e
r
2
(y2−y1)erb
fb
1
45o
A
Fig. 3.6 – Stationary contract
Let V A be the utility for agent 2 at point A. Then,
V A = ρ
(
−e−r(w+bA1 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
But, the stationary contract satisﬁes the relevant participation constraint with equality.
Then :
−e−r(w+bA1 ) + e−rw + βV A = 0
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Then, I have :
V A = (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
V A =
e−rw (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
1− β (1− ρ)
Then, if V = V A, the optimal contract is the contract represented by point A. If
V = V A, then the optimal contract is diﬀerent than the contract represented by point A,
but must monotonically converge to the A-contract. In the proof of Lemma 3.2, I have
seen that a contract can only diﬀer from a stable contract at the beginning and until the
state of nature switches. In other words, the transfer in state 1 at period t can be diﬀerent
from bA1 if state 2 is not yet realized in the t ﬁrst periods and the transfer in state 2 at
period t can be diﬀerent from bA2 if state 1 is not yet realized in the t ﬁrst periods.
This results in two types of contracts :
Type
1 :
• The transfer at period t is bA1 if the state of nature is 1.
• The transfer at period t is b∗2 ≤ bA2 if the state of nature is 2 at period
t and the state of nature was not realized in the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
• The transfer at period t is bA2 if the state of nature is 2 at period t
and the state of nature was realized in the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
Type
2 :
• The transfer at period t is bA2 if the state of nature is 2.
• The transfer at period t is b∗1 ≥ bA1 if the state of nature is 1 at period
t and the state of nature was not realized in the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
• The transfer at period t is bA1 if the state of nature is 1 at period t
and the state of nature was realized in the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
The type 1 contract gives more utility to agent 1 and less to agent 2 and the opposite
is true for type 2 contract. Then, when V ≤ V A, the optimal contract is type 1 and when
V ≥ V A, the optimal contract is type 2.
Now, I must calculate the transfer in the ﬁrst t periods in term of V . Let’s begin with
the case where V ≤ V A. Then,
V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+bA1 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
+ (1− ρ) (−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw + βV )
But, I ﬁnd bA1 by using the self-enforcing constraint :
−e−r(w+bA1 ) + e−rw + βV A = 0
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I obtain :
V = (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw + βV
)
V = (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw
)
+ (1− ρ) βV
(1− (1− ρ) β)V = (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw
)
(
1− (1− ρ)β
(1− ρ)
)
V =
(
−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw
)
(
1− (1− ρ)β
(1− ρ)
)
erwV =
(
1− e−rb∗2
)
And
e−rb
∗
2 = 1− 1− (1− ρ) β
(1− ρ) e
rwV
erb
∗
2 =
(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− [1− (1− ρ) β] erwV
If V = 0, then b∗2 = 0. If V = V A, then :
erb
∗
2 =
(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− [1− (1− ρ)β] erw e
−rw(1−ρ)

1−e−rbA2

1−β(1−ρ)
erb
∗
2 =
(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
erb
∗
2 = erb
A
2
Now, I examine the case where V > V A.
V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+b∗1) + e−rw + βV
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
(1− βρ)V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+b∗1) + e−rw
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw + βV A
)
(1− βρ) erwV = ρ
(
−e−rb∗1 + 1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerwV A
)
Then :
(1− βρ) erwV − (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerwV A
)
= ρ
(
−e−rbsb1 + 1
)
1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerwV A
)
= e−rb
sb
1
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Moreover, I have already found that V A =
(1−ρ)

−e−r(w+bA2 )+e−rw

1−β(1−ρ) . Hence,
e−rb
∗
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerw (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw
)
1− β (1− ρ)

e−rb
sb
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
−e−rbA2 + 1 + β (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbA2 + 1
)
1− β (1− ρ)

e−rb
sb
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
erb
sb
1 =
ρ (1− β + βρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) ∗ erd ∗ V
Let V MAX be the maximal value for V . Then, V MAX is reached when b∗1 = 0. To have
b∗1 = 0, I must have :
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ) erwV MAX = (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
V MAX =
(1− ρ) e−rw
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
The previous part of the proof gives the optimal contract relative to the value of V .
Then, if I replace those values in the utility function of agent 1, I obtain the Pareto frontier
equation. Let’s begin with the case where V ∈ [0, V A]. In this case, the utility function of
agent 1 is given by :
UOP
(
V
)
= ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1 + βUA
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erb∗2 + e−ry2 + βUOP (V ))
With
UA = ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1 + βUA
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erbA2 + e−ry2 + βUA
)
Because −e−r(y2−bA2 ) + e−ry2 + βUA = 0 by the self-enforcing constrain, I obtain :
UA = ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1 + βUA
)
UA =
ρ
(1− ρβ)
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
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Then,
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
(1− ρβ)
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
+(1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erb∗2 + e−ry2 + βUOP (V ))
(1− β + βρ)UOP (V ) = ρ
(1− ρβ)
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erb∗2 + e−ry2
)
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
(1− β + βρ) (1− ρβ)
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
+
(1− ρ)
(1− β + βρ)
(
−e−ry2erb∗2 + e−ry2
)
If I substitute erb
∗
2 = 1−ρ
1−ρ−erw(1−β+βρ)V , I obtain :
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
(1− β + βρ) (1− ρβ) +
(1− ρ) ∗ e−ry2
(1− β + βρ)
(
1− 1− ρ
1− ρ− erw (1− β + βρ)V
)
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bA1 ) + e−ry1
)
(1− β + βρ) (1− ρβ) +
(1− ρ) ∗ e−ry2
(1− β + βρ)
( −erw ∗ (1− β + βρ) ∗ V
1− ρ− erw (1− β + βρ)V
)
Now, for the case where V ∈ [V A, V MAX]. In this case, the utility function for agent
1 is given by :
UOP
(
V
)
= ρ
(
−e−r(y1−b∗1) + e−ry1 + βUOP (V ))+(1− ρ)(−e−r(y2−bA2 ) + e−ry2 + βf (V A))
I already know that −e−r(y2−bA2 ) + e−ry2 + βUA = 0. Then,
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
1− βρ
(
−e−r(y1−b∗1) + e−ry1
)
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
1− βρe
−ry11− ρ (1− β + βρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbA2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) erwV

Since the unconstrained Pareto frontier represents the maximum agent’s utilities under
all ﬁrst-best contracts, then the Pareto frontier when no ﬁrst-best contract is self-enforcing
is strictly lower. Another important point to underline is the discontinuity of the Pareto
frontier. Kocherlakota [12] says that the Pareto frontier is diﬀerentiable everywhere. In
fact, as corrected by Koeppl [13], the Pareto frontier is not diﬀerentiable everywhere
(Proposition 3.1). If I examine the Pareto frontier where a non-trivial solution exists, I
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ﬁnd that the Pareto frontier is continuous but not diﬀerentiable everywhere11. The problem
of diﬀerentiability occurs at the intersection of 2 segments.
This problem of discontinuity occurs also when some ﬁrst-best contracts are self-
enforcing. The next proposition shows the Pareto frontier in this case.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−ββ2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]2
and let
erb
B
1 = 1− β + βρ + (β − βρ) e r2 (y1−y2)
erb
B
1 = β − βρ+ (1− β + βρ) e r2 (y2−y1)
V B =
(β − βρ)
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
)
erw
(
1− (β − βρ)
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
))
erb
C
1 =
βρe−ry1+(1−βρ)e−ry2
βρe−ry1 + (1− βρ) e−r2 (y1+y2)
erb
C
2 =
βρe−ry1+(1−βρ)e−ry2
βρe
−r
2
(y1+y2) + (1− βρ) e−ry2
V C =
ρ
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
)(
β (1− ρ) e−ry2 − (1− βρ) e r2 (y1+y2)
)
erw (1− β) (βρery2 + (1− βρ) ery1)
V MAX =
(1− ρ) e−rw
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
Then,
- if V ∈ [0, V B], the optimal contract is given by :
– bt (ht, s) = bB1 if the state of nature s is 1.
– bt (ht, s) =
(1−ρ)
(1−ρ)−[1−(1−ρ)β]erwV if the history ht = (2, 2, ..., 2).
– bt (ht, s) = bB2 otherwise.
- if V ∈ [V B , V C], the optimal contract is given by :
– bt (ht, 1) =
ρ+(1−ρ)e r2 (y1−y2)
1−(1−β)erwV .
– bt (ht, 2) =
ρe
r
2 (y2−y1)+(1−ρ)
1−(1−β)erwV .
- if V ∈ [V C , V MAX], the optimal contract is given by :
– bt (ht, s) = bC2 if the state of nature s is 2.
– bt (ht, s) =
ρ(1−β+βρ)
ρ(1−β+βρ)+(1−ρ)

1−e−rbC2

−(1−ρβ)(1−β+βρ)∗erw∗V
if the history ht =
(1, 1, ..., 1).
– bt (ht, s) = bC1 otherwise.
And
11The continuity is quite obvious because each segment is continuous and at intersection of two segments,
the contract is deﬁned evenly on both segments.
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- if V ∈ [0, V B], then the Pareto frontier is given by :
UOP
(
V
)
=
(1− ρ) e−ry2
1− β + ρ
(
erb
B
2 − (1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− [1− (1− ρ)β] erwV
)
+
(
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bB1 ) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erbB2 + e−ry2
))
1− β
- if V ∈ [V B , V C], then the Pareto frontier is given by :
U sb =
1
1− β
Es [e−rys]− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV

- if V ∈ [V C , V MAX], then the Pareto frontier is given by :
USE
(
V
)
=
ρe−ry1
1− βρ
(
1− ρ (1− β + βρ)
γ
)
where γ = ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) ∗ erw ∗ V .
Proof. Since er(y2−y1) ≥
[
1 + 1−β
β2ρ∗(1−ρ)
]2
, then there exists some V ’s such that the
optimal contract is ﬁrst-best. Let’s ﬁnd the set of those V ’s.
The ﬁrst step is deﬁning the transfer in a ﬁrst-best contract in terms of V .
V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+bfb1 ) + e−rw + βV
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bfb2 ) + e−rw + βV
)
(1− β) erwV = ρ
(
1− e−rbfb1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbfb2
)
1− (1− β) erwV = ρe−rbfb1 + (1− ρ) e−rbfb2
By (3.5), e−rb
fb
2 = e−rb
fb
1 e−
r
2
(y2−y1). Consequently
1− (1− β) erwV = ρe−rbfb1 + (1− ρ) e−rbfb1 e− r2 (y2−y1)
ρ + (1− ρ) e r2 (y1−y2)
1− (1− β) erwV = e
rbfb1
And
erb
fb
2 =
ρe
r
2
(y2−y1) + (1− ρ)
1− (1− β) erwV
Let V B be the minimal utility of agent 2 when the contract is ﬁrst best and self-
enforcing. This contract is the ﬁrst-best contract satisfying the self-enforcing constraint of
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agent 2. Let bB1 and b
B
2 be the transfers of the ﬁrst-best contract for V
B. Then, I ﬁnd that
erb
B
1 = 1− β + βρ+ (β − βρ) e r2 (y1−y2)
erb
B
1 = β − βρ + (1− β + βρ) e r2 (y2−y1)
V B =
(β − βρ)
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
)
erw
(
1− (β − βρ)
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
))
Now, for the maximal V , denoted V C , given an optimal ﬁrst-best contract, I must use
the self-enforcing constraint of agent 1. Let bC1 and b
C
2 be the transfers of the ﬁrst-best
contract for V C which is given by
erb
C
1 =
βρe−ry1+(1−βρ)e−ry2
βρe−ry1 + (1− βρ) e−r2 (y1+y2)
erb
C
2 =
βρe−ry1+(1−βρ)e−ry2
βρe
−r
2
(y1+y2) + (1− βρ) e−ry2
V C =
ρ
(
1− e r2 (y1−y2)
)(
β (1− ρ) e−ry2 − (1− βρ) e r2 (y1+y2)
)
erw (1− β) (βρery2 + (1− βρ) ery1)
If V ∈ [V B, V C], then the optimal contract is given by the ﬁrst-best contract given
by :
erb
fb
1 =
ρ + (1− ρ) e r2 (y1−y2)
1− (1− β) erwV
erb
fb
2 =
ρe
r
2
(y2−y1) + (1− ρ)
1− (1− β) erwV
Now, I study the case when V < V B . Equivalent to the proof of Proposition 3.5, the
optimal contract in this case is given by :
– The transfer at period t is bB1 if the state of nature is 1.
– The transfer at period t is b∗2 ≤ bB2 if the state of nature is 2 at period t and the
other possible state of nature has not been realized at any moment during the ﬁrst
t− 1 periods.
– The transfer at period t is bB2 if the state of nature is 2 at period t and the other
possible state of nature was realized at some point during the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
To ﬁnd b∗2, I must solve
V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+bB1 ) + e−rw + βV B
)
+ (1− ρ) (−e−r(w+b∗2) + e−rw + βV )
But, I have found that bB1 by using the self-enforcing constraint :
−e−r(w+bB1 ) + e−rw + βV B = 0
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I obtain :
erb
∗
2 =
(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− [1− (1− ρ) β] erwV
When V > V C , the optimal contract in this case is given by :
– The transfer at period t is bC2 if the state of nature is 2.
– The transfer at period t is b∗1 ≥ bC1 if the state of nature is 1 at period t and the
state of nature has not been realized at any moment during the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
– The transfer at period t is bC1 if the state of nature is 1 at period t and the state of
nature was realized at some point during the ﬁrst t− 1 periods.
To ﬁnd b∗1, I must isolate it in :
V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+b∗1) + e−rw + βV
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bC2 ) + e−rw + βV C
)
With some manipulations...
(1− βρ)V = ρ
(
−e−r(w+b∗1) + e−rw
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bC2 ) + e−rw + βV C
)
(1− βρ) erwV = ρ
(
−e−rb∗1 + 1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbC2 + 1 + βerwV C
)
(1− βρ) erwV − (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerwV A
)
= ρ
(
−e−rbsb1 + 1
)
1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(
−e−rbA2 + 1 + βerwV A
)
= e−rb
sb
1
By the self-enforcing constraint of agent 2, I have V C =
(1−ρ)

−e−r(w+bC2 )+e−rw

1−β(1−ρ) .
e−rb
∗
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
−e−rbC2 + 1 + βerw (1− ρ)
(
−e−r(w+bA2 ) + e−rw
)
1− β (1− ρ)

e−rb
sb
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ
−e−rbC2 + 1 + β (1− ρ)
(
−e−rbC2 + 1
)
1− β (1− ρ)

e−rb
sb
1 = 1− (1− βρ)
ρ
erwV +
(1− ρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
erb
sb
1 =
ρ (1− β + βρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) ∗ erd ∗ V
77
Let V MAX be the maximal value for V . Then, V MAX is reached when b∗1 = 0. To have
b∗1 = 0, I must have :
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ) erwV MAX = (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
V MAX =
(1− ρ) e−rw
(1− βρ) (1− β + βρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
I have already found that the Pareto frontier is composed of three parts. Let’s begin
with the second one, when the optimal contract is ﬁrst-best. By Proposition 3.4, I know
that the Pareto frontier is given by :
Ufb =
1
1− β
Es [e−rys]− Es
[
e−
r
2
ys
]2
1− (1− β) erwV

Then, when V ∈ [V B, V C], the Pareto frontier is given by this relation.
For the ﬁrst case, i.e. when V ∈ [0, V B], I can use the same approach from the
preceding proof.
UOP
(
V
)
= ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bB1 ) + e−ry1 + βUB
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erb∗2 + e−ry2 + βUOP (V ))
With
UB = ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bB1 ) + e−ry1 + βUB
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erbB2 + e−ry2 + βUB
)
If I compute UOP − UB , I ﬁnd that
UOP
(
V
)− UB = (1− ρ)(−e−ry2 (erb∗2 − erbB2 )+ β (UOP − UB) (V ))
UOP
(
V
)− UB = (1− ρ) e−ry2
1− β + ρ
(
erb
B
2 − erb∗2
)
Then,
UOP
(
V
)
=
(1− ρ) e−ry2
1− β + ρ
(
erb
B
2 − erb∗2
)
+
(
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bB1 ) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erbB2 + e−ry2
))
1− β
And if I replace erb
∗
2 by (1−ρ)
(1−ρ)−[1−(1−ρ)β]erwV , I ﬁnd that :
UOP
(
V
)
=
(1− ρ) e−ry2
1− β + ρ
(
erb
B
2 − (1− ρ)
(1− ρ)− [1− (1− ρ) β] erwV
)
+
(
ρ
(
−e−r(y1−bB1 ) + e−ry1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
−e−ry2erbB2 + e−ry2
))
1− β
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Now, for the case where V ∈ [V C , V MAX]. In this case, the utility function of agent 1
is given by :
UOP
(
V
)
= ρ
(
−e−r(y1−b∗1) + e−ry1 + βUOP (V ))+(1− ρ)(−e−r(y2−bC2 ) + e−ry2 + βf (V C))
I already know that −e−r(y2−bC2 ) + e−ry2 + βUC = 0. Then,
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
1− βρ
(
−e−r(y1−b∗1) + e−ry1
)
UOP
(
V
)
=
ρ
1− βρe
−ry11− ρ (1− β + βρ)
ρ (1− β + βρ) + (1− ρ)
(
1− e−rbC2
)
− (1− ρβ) (1− β + βρ) erwV

Of course, the Pareto frontier in each case is dominated by the Pareto frontier in the
case without self-enforcing constraints.12 Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate this fact.
V
U
UOP (0)
V MAXV A
UU
USE
Fig. 3.7 – Pareto Frontier with no self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contracts
At the opposite of the case where no ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing, a part of
the unconstrained Pareto frontier may be reached when some ﬁrst-best contracts are self-
enforcing. This comes from the fact that, if a ﬁrst-best contract is self-enforcing, then
self-enforcing constraints do not apply and the problem is similar to the one without
12The Pareto frontier in case where some ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing is weakly dominated while
the Pareto frontier in the other case is dominated everywhere.
79
V
U
UOP (0)
V MAXV B V C
UU
USE
Fig. 3.8 – Pareto Frontier with self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contracts
self-enforcing constraints.
If I take a look at Figure 3.8, I see that the Pareto frontier reaches the unconstrained
Pareto frontier at the middle. At the extremities, self-enforcing constraints apply and no
ﬁrst-best contracts are possible. The gain to respect the contract is not high enough to
compensate agents to accept a net transfer to the other. In extremities, a NTSEC exists
but it cannot be ﬁrst-best.
3.4 Variance
Thomas and Worrall [19] show that there exist 2 thresholds β∗ and β∗ with 0 < β∗ <
β∗ < 1 such that for any β ∈ [0, β∗] the optimal contract is the TSEC ; for any β ∈ (β∗, β∗)
the optimal contract is NTSEC but this contract is not ﬁrst-best ; and for β ∈ [β∗, 1) some
ﬁrst-best contracts are self-enforcing. I now examine the eﬀect of the variance on these
thresholds.
To do so, I constrain our analysis to the case where agent 2 is risk-neutral. In this case,
the problem can be written as
MAX U (δ, h1) (3.6)
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subject to
V (δ, h1) ≥ V
u (ys − bτ (hτ , s))− u (ys) + βU (δ, hτ+1) ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
bτ (hτ , s) + βV (δ, hτ+1) ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... ∀s ∈ S, ∀hτ
Let F(F1) be the set of all distribution functions for which the number of states of
nature is equal to the number of states of nature of F1 and the revenue in state s is given
by (ys)1+γ ((ys)1 − y) for y = Es[(ys)1] and for all γ > 0. Note that for all distributions of
revenue F2 ∈ F(F1), the expected revenue is equal to the expected revenue of F1, in other
words Es[(ys)2] = Es[(ys)1]. Distribution F2 is a mean-preserving spread of distribution
F1.
Proposition 3.7 Suppose I have two distributions of revenue, F1 and F2 ∈ F(F1). Let
y1 be the expected value of the revenue under F1. Let (β∗)1 and β∗1 be respectively the
threshold to have a NTSEC and the threshold to have a ﬁrst-best self-enforcing contract
with the distribution of revenues F1 and let (β∗)2 and β∗2 be the thresholds with F2. Then
a) (β∗)1 > (β∗)2 ;
b) β∗1 > β∗2 .
Proof. a) : Let β > (β∗)1 and δ1 be the optimal contract. Then I have for t = 1, 2, ...,
∀s ∈ S and ∀ht,
u
(
(ys)1 − b1t (ht, s)
)− u ((ys)1) + βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t [u (yτ1 − bτ (hτ , s))− u (yτ1 )]
]
≥ 0
By strict concavity of u, then
u
(
(ys)2 − b1t (ht, s)
)− u ((ys)2) + βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
u
(
yτ2 − b1τ (hτ , s)
)− u (yτ2 )]
]
> 0
Let δ˜2 be the contract such that b˜2τ (hτ , s) = b1τ (hτ , s) +  with  > 0. By continuity, I
know there exists an  such that
u
(
(ys)2 − b2t (ht, s)
)− u ((ys)2) + βU (δ2, ht+1) > 0
b2t (ht, s) + βV
(
δ2, ht+1
)
> 0
Then, I can ﬁnd a NTSEC for every β > (β∗)1. Since u and v are strictly increasing,
then (β∗)1 > (β∗)2.
b) Now, let δ1 be the optimal ﬁrst-best contract when the distribution of revenue is F1
and β = β∗1 . Since δ1 is ﬁrst-best, then transfers are independent of the history. Let b1s be
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the transfer in state s. By deﬁnition, if δ1 is a ﬁrst-best contract, the ratios of marginal
utilities for agent 1 and agent 2 for each state must be equal.
u′
(
(y1)2 − b11
)
v′
(
w + b11
) = u′ ((y2)2 − b12)
v′
(
w + b12
) = ... = u′ ((yS)2 − b1S)
v′
(
w + b1S
)
If agent 2 is risk-neutral, then the ﬁrst-best contract leaves agent 1 with a constant
stream of net revenue,
(ys)1 − b1s = (yσ)1 − b1σ ∀s, σ ∈ S (3.7)
Let b1 be the expected value of the transfers under the distribution F1. Consider the
contract δ2 where b2s = (1 + γ)b
1
s.
If I examine agent 2’s self-enforcing constraints with the contract δ2, I have that ∀s ∈ S,
b2s + βE
t
s
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tb2s
]
If I replace b2s with their values, I ﬁnd
(1 + γ)b1s + βE
t
s
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(1 + γ)b1s
]
(1 + γ)
(
b1s + βE
t
s
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tb1s
])
Since δ1 is self-enforcing, then .
(1 + γ)
(
b1s + βE
t
s
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tb1s
])
≥ 0
If I examine agent 1’s self-enforcing constraints under the distribution F2, I have that
∀s ∈ S,
u
(
(ys)2 − b2s
)− u ((ys)2) + βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
u
(
yτ2 − b2s
)− u (yτ2 )]
]
If I replace (ys)2 and b2s by their values, I ﬁnd
u
(
(ys)1 + γ ((ys)1 − y)− (1 + γ)b1s
)− u ((ys)1 + γ ((ys)1 − y))
+βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
u
(
yτ1 + γ (y
τ
1 − y)− (1 + γ)b1s
)− u (yτ1 + γ (yτ1 − y))]
]
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u
(
(1 + γ)((ys)1 − b1s)− γy
)− u ((1 + γ)(ys)1 − γy)
+βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
u
(
(1 + γ)(yτ1 − b1s)− γy
)− u ((1 + γ)yτ1 − γy)]
]
Because the self-enforcing constraints for agent 1 matter only when transfers are posi-
tive, which is the case when revenues are high, I concentrate my attention on those cases.
Since (1 + γ)((ys)1 − b1s)− γy < (ys)1 − b1s when (ys)1 < y and (1 + γ)((ys)1 − b1s)− γy >
(ys)1−b1s when (ys)1 > y, then, by the strictly concavity of u and since δ1 is self-enforcing,
I have that
u
(
(1 + γ)((ys)1 − b1s)− γy
)− u ((1 + γ)(ys)1 − γy)
+βEts
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
u
(
(1 + γ)(yτ1 − b1s)− γy
)− u ((1 + γ)yτ1 − γy)]
]
> 0
By the same argument I use in a), there exists a  > 0 such that the contract δ	 with
b	s = b2s + , which is ﬁrst-best, respects the self-enforcing constraint with strict inequality.
When the variance increases, the gain for agent 1 to sign a contract increases since
agent 1 is risk-averse. Then, the incentive is bigger for agent 1 to sign a contract. Without
the assumption about the type of change in agent 1’s revenue, an increase in the variance
does not necessarily result in a lower threshold.13 It could be that the increase in the
tails are so large that they cannot be compensated by other states of nature. Take the
following example : Suppose that there are two revenue distributions F1 and F2. Let piy be
the probability to get y under the distribution function Fi. Suppose F1 is characterized by
p15 = p
1
10 = 0.5. Suppose also that p
2
5 = p
2
10 = 0.495, p
2
0 = 0.009925 and p
2
1000 = 0.000075.
It is easy to show that the expected revenue is the same under F1 and F2 but the variance
under F2 is higher. The gain to break the contract when the revenue is 1000 could be
positive for any possible contract and then, it is possible that, for a given discount factor
β, there is a NTSEC for F1 but not for F2.
3.5 Merger
The question of mergers in the context of self-enforcing constraints is interesting. It
has often been argued that conglomerates serve the purpose of providing insurance to
shareholders. With the sophistication of ﬁnancial markets, many have raised doubts about
the ability of mergers for providing insurance beyond that which shareholders can get
13It is possible to get this kind of result for the case where agent 2 has a random revenue but the
condition over the increase in the variance does not stay the same. To obtain a result in the case of random
revenue for both agents, I must deﬁne some conditions on revenues of both agents.
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by themselves. This is certainly true in the presence of perfect ﬁnancial markets. When
these markets are imperfect, however, conglomerates may play a role. A merger could
potentially provide better insurance than imperfect ﬁnancial markets. I examine this logic
when ﬁnancial imperfections are caused by commitment problems, meaning that ﬁnancial
contracts must be self-enforcing.
In the previous section, I show that an increase in the variance decreases the thre-
shold beyond which it is possible to sign a NTSEC. Proposition 3.7 gives the possibility
to discuss mergers of ﬁrms with perfectly correlated revenues. If two ﬁrms have perfectly
correlated revenues, then the merged ﬁrm will have the same number of states of nature.
By Proposition 3.7, if ﬁrm revenues are negatively correlated, then the merger decreases
the variance and thresholds increase. But, since the merged ﬁrm has smoother post-merger
revenue, the ﬁnal eﬀect is quite diﬃcult to predict. In the case of perfect positive correla-
tion, the merger increases the range of β’s for which there exists a NTSEC. On the other
hand, the variance of the revenues increases at the same time. Consequently, the ultimate
impact of the merger on agent 1’ utility is diﬃcult to see. To get an idea about the possible
outcomes, I use a numerical example.
I use a CARA function to model a risk-averse agent’s utility and I suppose there are
two symmetric risk-averse ﬁrms with random revenues. They have the possibility of signing
a self-enforcing contract with a risk-neutral agent (the market). There are two states of
nature with equal probability (12). In the bad state, ﬁrms get $1 each and they get $3 in
the good state. Let the risk-aversion coeﬃcient for both ﬁrms r equal to 1. Firm 1 has
to choose between two possibilities : either stand alone to get ﬁnancing, or to merge with
another ﬁrm and then get ﬁnancing.
3.5.1 Stand-alone case
Both ﬁrms are symmetric and thus I study the stand alone problem for one ﬁrm, say
ﬁrm 1. Let x1 and x2 be ﬁrm 1’s revenue in states 1 and 2 respectively and b1 and b2 the
transfers. I assume that there are many risk-neutral agents. Consequently, the reservation
value for them is 0 and I can write the stand-alone problem as follows :
MAX E1s
[
−e−r(xs−b1(h1,s)) + e−rxs + βU (δ, h2)
]
(3.8)
subject to
E1s [b1 (h1, s) + βV (δ, h2)] ≥ 0
−e−r(xs−bτ (hτ ,s)) + e−rxs + βEτs [U (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... s = 1, 2 ∀hτ
bτ (hτ , s) + βEτs [V (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0 τ = 1, 2, ... s = 1, 2 ∀hτ
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Let USA be the expected utility for ﬁrm 1 in the stand-alone situation. I deﬁne the per
period certainty equivalent (CESA) as the amount of money for which ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent
between this amount and its net revenue with the self-enforcing contract. In other words,
the certainty equivalent in the stand-alone case is such that
−e−rCESA = (1− β)USA
Table I gives USA for diﬀerent values of β. The thresholds to have a NTSEC and
to have a self-enforcing ﬁrst-best contract are approximately β∗ = 0.52 and β∗ = 0.76
respectively.
Tab. I: Utility of ﬁrm 1 in the stand-alone case
β USA CESA β USA CESA
0.20 -0.261042 1.5662 0.60 -0.460352 1.6921
0.22 -0.267735 1.5662 0.62 -0.466551 1.7300
0.24 -0.274781 1.5662 0.64 -0.475109 1.7659
0.26 -0.282207 1.5662 0.66 -0.486559 1.7992
0.28 -0.290046 1.5662 0.68 -0.501567 1.8295
0.30 -0.298333 1.5662 0.70 -0.520951 1.8561
0.32 -0.307108 1.5662 0.72 -0.545875 1.8783
0.34 -0.316414 1.5662 0.74 -0.577699 1.8958
0.36 -0.326302 1.5662 0.76 -0.618338 1.9078
0.38 -0.336828 1.5662 0.78 -0.669118 1.9159
0.40 -0.348055 1.5662 0.80 -0.730235 1.9238
0.42 -0.360057 1.5662 0.82 -0.805026 1.9317
0.44 -0.372917 1.5662 0.84 -0.898617 1.9395
0.46 -0.386728 1.5662 0.86 -1.019065 1.9472
0.48 -0.401602 1.5662 0.88 -1.179796 1.9549
0.50 -0.417667 1.5662 0.90 -1.404976 1.9626
0.52 -0.435069 1.5662 0.92 -1.742939 1.9702
0.54 -0.451988 1.5706 0.94 -2.306465 1.9777
0.56 -0.453389 1.6120 0.96 -3.433892 1.9852
0.58 -0.456081 1.6526 0.98 -6.816911 1.9926
Figure 3.9 graphs the certainty equivalent as a function of β. Note that there are
two breakpoints. The ﬁrst breakpoint is when β reaches 0.52. For all β lower than or
equal to 0.52, there is no NTSEC. Agent 1 is unable to sign a contract which is non-
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trivial. Consequently, the per period utility remains unchanged while β increases but
the certainty equivalent for the stand-alone case does not change with the value of β.14
For greater values, some non-trivial contracts become self-enforcing, so the value for the
certainty equivalent increases. The other breakpoint arrives at β = 0.76. At this point, the
optimal self-enforcing contract converges to a ﬁrst-best contract.
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Fig. 3.9 – Certainty Equivalent
3.5.2 Merger case
The second possibility for ﬁrm 1 is to buy ﬁrm 2 by paying CESA in each period, and
signing a self-enforcing contract considering that it gets the aggregate revenue. Since I
have two states of nature for each ﬁrm, the merged ﬁrm will face four states of nature.
Tab. II: States of nature
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
ﬁrm 1 revenue 1 3 1 3
ﬁrm 2 revenue 1 1 3 3
14USA changes since it’s the weighted sum of present and future gains in utility.
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To study the eﬀect of correlation between ﬁrm revenues on the proﬁtability of the
merger, I need to deﬁne the coeﬃcient of correlation ρ which is given by
ρ =
COV (X,Y )
σXσY
where σX and σY are the standard error of revenues for ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 respectively.
Table III gives the probability of each state of nature for diﬀerent coeﬃcients of cor-
relation.
Tab. III: Coeﬃcient of correlation and states of nature
ρ state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4
-1 0 0.5 0.5 0
-0.8 0.05 0.45 0.45 0.05
-0.5 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125
-0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
0.5 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375
0.8 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.45
1 0.5 0 0 0.5
Since there are two states of nature for each ﬁrm and they have symmetric payoﬀs,
the merged ﬁrm faces three diﬀerent states of nature. Let z1 = 2, z2 = 4 and z3 = 6 be
the revenues in each state. Using this approach allows for a simple model in which I can
analyze the eﬀect of correlation between ﬁrm revenues.
Let bt (ht, s)) be the transfer for period t in state s.15 I suppose that the per period cost
of acquiring ﬁrm 2 is its certainty equivalent (CESA). Then, the problem of the merged
ﬁrm16 is
MAX E1s
[
−e−r(zs−b1(h1,s))−CESA) + e−r(zs−CESA) + βU (δ, h2)
]
(3.9)
15Because there are more than 2 states of nature, the stationary contract is dependent on the history.
16With CARA utility functions, the payment of CESA does not aﬀect the resolution of the problem.
It is possible to isolate erCESA in the objective function and in the ﬁrm self-enforcing constraints. Then,
erCESA aﬀects only the utility but not the optimal contract itself.
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subject to
E1s [b1 (h1, s)) + βV (δ, h2)] ≥ V
and τ = 1, 2, ..., s = 1, 2, 3 and ∀hτ ,
−e−r(zs−bτ (hτ ,s))−CESA) + e−r(zs−CESA) + βEτs [U (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0
bτ (hτ , s)) + βEτs [V (δ, hτ+1)] ≥ 0
The expected utility of the merged ﬁrm is given by UM .
Tab. IV: Net gain of utility from the merger (positive value
in bold)
β ρ = −1 ρ = −0.8 ρ = −0.5 ρ = −0.2 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 1
0.20 0.151 0.121 0.076 0.030 0 -0.030 -0.076 -0.121 -0.151
0.22 0.155 0.124 0.078 0.031 0 -0.031 -0.078 -0.124 -0.155
0.24 0.159 0.128 0.080 0.032 0 -0.032 -0.080 -0.128 -0.158
0.26 0.164 0.131 0.082 0.033 0 -0.033 -0.082 -0.125 -0.143
0.28 0.168 0.135 0.084 0.034 0 -0.034 -0.084 -0.111 -0.127
0.30 0.173 0.138 0.087 0.035 0 -0.035 -0.073 -0.097 -0.110
0.32 0.178 0.143 0.089 0.036 0 -0.034 -0.060 -0.081 -0.093
0.34 0.184 0.147 0.092 0.037 0 -0.023 -0.046 -0.065 -0.076
0.36 0.189 0.151 0.095 0.038 0.006 -0.012 -0.032 -0.048 -0.058
0.38 0.195 0.156 0.098 0.039 0.016 0.001 -0.017 -0.031 -0.039
0.40 0.202 0.162 0.101 0.045 0.027 0.014 -0.001 -0.014 -0.021
0.42 0.209 0.167 0.104 0.055 0.040 0.029 0.015 0.005 -0.002
0.44 0.216 0.173 0.108 0.066 0.053 0.044 0.032 0.023 0.018
0.46 0.224 0.180 0.112 0.079 0.067 0.059 0.049 0.038 0.037
0.48 0.233 0.186 0.117 0.092 0.083 0.076 0.068 0.055 0.056
0.50 0.242 0.194 0.127 0.107 0.099 0.093 0.078 0.072 0.075
0.52 0.252 0.202 0.139 0.122 0.116 0.111 0.092 0.088 0.094
0.54 0.261 0.208 0.149 0.136 0.131 0.116 0.102 0.101 0.109
0.56 0.245 0.187 0.132 0.121 0.117 0.094 0.080 0.082 0.093
0.58 0.228 0.166 0.115 0.106 0.087 0.070 0.057 0.061 0.075
0.60 0.212 0.143 0.098 0.092 0.062 0.044 0.029 0.037 0.055
0.62 0.195 0.120 0.082 0.061 0.034 0.015 0.001 0.045 0.035
0.64 0.178 0.096 0.067 0.034 0.004 -0.019 -0.031 0.024 0.015
0.66 0.161 0.071 0.053 0.004 -0.029 -0.053 0.012 0.005 -0.004
0.68 0.145 0.051 0.040 -0.029 -0.066 -0.091 0.001 -0.014 -0.023
Continued on next page
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β ρ = −1 ρ = −0.8 ρ = −0.5 ρ = −0.2 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 1
0.70 0.130 0.034 0.031 -0.063 -0.104 0.001 -0.016 -0.031 -0.039
0.72 0.118 0.021 -0.011 -0.100 0 -0.014 -0.031 -0.044 -0.052
0.74 0.109 0.013 -0.037 -0.138 -0.012 -0.025 -0.041 -0.054 -0.062
0.76 0.104 0.012 -0.063 -0.003 -0.018 -0.031 -0.046 -0.058 -0.065
0.78 0.104 0.016 -0.090 -0.006 -0.020 -0.032 -0.046 -0.058 -0.065
0.80 0.103 0.021 -0.123 -0.008 -0.022 -0.033 -0.047 -0.058 -0.063
0.82 0.103 0.027 -0.165 -0.011 -0.024 -0.035 -0.047 -0.057 -0.062
0.84 0.102 0.034 0.013 -0.014 -0.026 -0.036 -0.047 -0.057 -0.061
0.86 0.102 -0.010 0.009 -0.017 -0.028 -0.038 -0.048 -0.056 -0.061
0.88 0.102 -0.050 0.004 -0.020 -0.031 -0.039 -0.049 -0.056 -0.060
0.90 0.101 -0.107 -0.002 -0.024 -0.034 -0.041 -0.049 -0.055 -0.057
0.92 0.101 0.033 -0.009 -0.029 -0.037 -0.043 -0.050 -0.055 -0.058
0.94 0.101 0.023 -0.017 -0.034 -0.041 -0.046 -0.051 -0.055 -0.057
0.96 0.100 0.008 -0.027 -0.040 -0.045 -0.048 -0.052 -0.055 -0.056
0.98 0.100 -0.015 -0.039 -0.046 -0.049 -0.051 -0.053 -0.054 -0.055
Table V gives the value of the thresholds for each value of ρ. In the previous section, I
ﬁnd that the thresholds β∗ and β∗ must decrease (increase) while variance increases (de-
creases). Since the variance increases with the correlation coeﬃcient, I have that thresholds
decrease with ρ. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the results of Proposition 3.7.
Tab. V: Thresholds for NTSEC
β ρ = −0.8 ρ = −0.5 ρ = −0.2 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 1 stand-alone
β∗ 0.68 0.48 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.52
β∗ 0.92 0.82 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.76
3.5.3 Results
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the diﬀerences in utility levels between the merger case
with diﬀerent correlations and the stand-alone case.
To analyze the eﬀect of a merger, consider four cases : the perfect negative correlation
case (ρ = −1), the negative (non perfect) correlation case (ρ = −0.5), the no correlation
case (ρ = 0) and the positive (non perfect) correlation case (ρ = 0.8).
Case 1 : The case of perfect negative correlation is represented by ρ = −1. This situation
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Fig. 3.10 – Negative Correlation and Merger
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could arise when one ﬁrm has contracyclical revenues relative to the other one. Figure
3.12 shows the certainty equivalent in the stand-alone case CESA and in the merger
case CEM with ρ = −1.
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Fig. 3.12 – Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with ρ = −1
Note that the certainty equivalent in both cases have the same form but inverse.
This particularity comes from the fact that, in the perfect negative correlation case,
the ﬁrm revenue is constant for any given β. Consequently, there is no gain to sign
a self-enforcing contract. However, CEM is decreasing since ﬁrm 1 must pay CESA
to ﬁrm 2. Since CESA depends on the value of β, the certainty equivalent for the
merger case is decreasing with β but always greater than the certainty equivalent of
the stand-alone case.
Case 2 : When revenues are negatively, but not perfectly, correlated (ρ = −0.5), the
beneﬁt associated with a merger can be positive or negative depending on the value
of β.
If β is lower than 0.48, there is no NTSEC for either the merged ﬁrm or the stand-
alone ﬁrm, as there is for the stand-alone ﬁrm. But, the merged ﬁrm has a smoother
revenue stream which leaves the ﬁrm with a gain by merging (see Figure 3.13). When
β is between 0.48 and 0.52, it becomes possible for the merged ﬁrm to sign a NTSEC.
The relative gain in utility becomes more important. At β = 0.52, it is possible for
the stand-alone ﬁrm to sign a NTSEC. So the gain resulting from merging decreases
and becomes negative at β = 0.72. For β > 0.82, it becomes possible for the merged
ﬁrm to sign a ﬁrst-best convergent contract. So the gain increases again with β but
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Fig. 3.13 – Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with ρ =
−0.5
there is a threshold for which the gain cannot overcome the ﬁrst-best convergent
contract gain in the stand-alone case. After a small range of values for β (between
0.84 and 0.88) for which the merged ﬁrm gains, the net gain decreases and becomes
negative.
What happens when β is close to 1 is another interesting case to study. When
β is high enough, the merged ﬁrm and the stand-alone ﬁrm can sign a ﬁrst-best
convergent contract. Then, why does the merger appear non-proﬁtable for β close
to 1 ? First, by Proposition 3.3, if β > β∗, then the optimal contract converges
monotonically to a ﬁrst-best contract. Since I use the assumption that the reservation
utility level for the market is equal to zero, the optimal contract, in both cases,
converges to the ﬁrst-best contract satisfying the self-enforcing constraints of the
market. Let’s suppose that δSA and δM are those ﬁrst-best contracts. Then,
bSA1 +
β
1− βEs[b
SA
s ] = 0
bM1 +
β
1− βEs[b
M
s ] = 0
where bSAs and bMs are respectively the transfer in state s for the stand-alone case
and the merged case. I have already found (Equation (3.5)) that biz = bis+yτz −yts for
i = SA,M . If I introduce these equations into the market self-enforcing constraints,
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I ﬁnd :
bSA1 +
β
1− βEs[b
SA
1 + 10000 − xs] = 0
bM1 +
β
1− βEs[b
SA
1 + 20000 − zs] = 0
and
bSA1 +
β
1− β
(
bSA1 + 10000 − 20000]
)
= 0
bM1 +
β
1− β
(
bSA1 + 20000 − 40000]
)
= 0
I obtain that bM1 = 2b
SA
1 . This means that, once we subtract the CESA, the merged
entity obtains the same level of utility than the stand-alone ﬁrm. Consequently, the
optimal contracts of the merger case and the stand-alone case converge to ﬁrst-best
contracts that give the same level of utility.
Second, I know that optimal contracts are not ﬁrst-best. They converge to some ﬁrst-
best contracts, but before state 1 is realized (see Section 3.3), transfers do not satisfy
(3.5). Until then, the stand-alone ﬁrm gain more than the merged ﬁrm. Because of
the concavity of CARA utility functions, the expected gain for being in the good
state (state 2 for the stand-alone case and state 3 for the merger case) is higher in
the stand-alone situation. It is therefore better for the ﬁrm to stand alone than to
merge. This result applies to all cases where the correlation coeﬃcient is not −1.17
Case 3 : The independent case (ρ = 0) characterizes ﬁrms involved in diﬀerent markets
which are neither complements nor substitutes. In this case, there is no gain from
merging when β is lower than 0.36. At this point, the merged ﬁrm can sign a NTSEC
which leaves the ﬁrm better oﬀ. As for other cases, when β reaches 0.52, the gain from
merging decreases. When β reaches 0.66, the net gain to merge becomes negative
and remains negative while β increase. At β = 0.72, the merged ﬁrm can sign a
ﬁrst-best contract and the gain from merging increases but it is counterbalanced by
the stand-alone contracting gain (see Figure 3.14).
Case 4 : The case where ﬁrms produce complements is represented by a positive corre-
lation. With positive correlation (ρ = 0.8), the net gain from merging is negative
for β < 0.26 (see Figure 3.15). At β = 0.26, the merged ﬁrm signs a NTSEC and
the gain starts to increase. For β between 0.52 and 0.60, the gain diminishes as the
stand-alone ﬁrm signs a NTSEC. For β > 0.60, the merged ﬁrm can sign a ﬁrst-best
contract. Consequently, the gain from the optimal ﬁrst-best contract increases but
17When the correlation coeﬃcient goes to -1, then the value of β such that to stand alone is better
increases. For example, when ρ = −0.9, to stand alone is better when β is higher than 0.99.
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Fig. 3.14 – Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with ρ = 0
the beneﬁt to sign a contract for the stand-alone ﬁrm becomes more important, so
the merger leaves more proﬁts. Even with positively correlated revenues, there is
an interval of β (in this case between 0.42 and 0.66) for which a merger could be
proﬁtable for the merged ﬁrm.
I can use the analysis I have from these diﬀerent cases to draw general conclusions
for the question of merger in a self-enforcing environment. If revenues are nearly per-
fectly negatively correlated, then the merger allows the new owner to smooth its revenues
across time without any contract. This situation leads to the agent always being better
oﬀ merging.
What is interesting is the inﬂuence of the correlation on the gain of a merger. When
revenues are negatively correlated, the merger creates a kind of internal insurance market.
The smoother revenue schedule leads to a gain in utility by decreasing the variance of
revenues but decreases the possible gain from signing an insurance contract with the
market. If beta is high but not too close of 1, then the merger could be beneﬁcial. Take
the case where ρ = −0.8. The merger option leaves the merged ﬁrm with gain when β is
greater than 0.92 but smaller than 0.98. For all ρ > −1, then there exists a β˜ < 1 such
that for all β ∈ [β˜, 1), then to stand alone is better for shareholders.
With no correlation, the new owner has the possibility of signing a contract in the case
where β is small. Since the variance has increased, the possibility to sign a NTSEC has
increased. But, the agent may do better in the stand-alone case depending of the value of
β. As ρ goes to 1 (positive correlation), the threshold for having a self-enforcing contract
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Fig. 3.15 – Certainty Equivalent for the stand-alone case and the merger case with ρ = 0.8
decreases but it is possible that the gain from the contract cannot compensate the cost
stemming from the increase of variance. So in the end, the agent is worse over for the
majority of values of β.
3.6 Conclusion
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I explicitly solve the contract design problem with self-
enforcing constraints. To obtain this solution, I must impose additional constraints on
the model. The most important one is on the number of states of nature. The two states
of nature problem is relatively easy to solve since there are only two transfers in the
stationary contract. With three states, the number of transfers increases to four, and with
four states, the number of transfers in the stationary contract is eight. The number of
transfers in the stationary contract increases more quickly than the number of states of
nature.
In the second part, I ﬁnd that variance aﬀects the nature of the contract. If the va-
riance increases, then the potential beneﬁts with respect to the contract increases and the
threshold to have a NTSEC decreases.
The most interesting ﬁnding is the eﬀect of self-enforcing constraints on the eﬀects of
a merger. I ﬁnd that, even with a very high positive correlation between ﬁrms’ revenues,
there is some discount value for which ﬁrms could gain by a merger. The most important
parameter in the merger decision seems to be the discount factor. If owners are not really
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patient, then a merger could lead to an increase in utility. This could explain in part
why ﬁrms in the same market merge together while their revenues are highly positively
correlated.
One of the possible avenues for future research would be to test the sensibility of these
results to a change in the risk-aversion coeﬃcient. My guess is that it will not change the
scheme of the results but the level of thresholds.
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Conclusion
Dans cette the`se, j’ai e´tudie´ trois proble´matiques relie´es a` la the´orie microe´conomique.
J’ai aborde´ un proble`me de strate´gie optimale pour une ﬁrme multiproduit, la question
de rationalisation dans le cadre d’allocation de biens indivisibles et le design de contrats
d’assurance en pre´sence de contraintes auto-exe´cutoires.
Dans le premier chapitre, j’ai mode´lise´ un monopoleur multiproduit ayant comme
strate´gies possibles le fait de monitorer ou non. Tout d’abord, avec des hypothe`ses rela-
tivement standard utilise´es dans la litte´rature en organisation industrielle18, je re´ussis a`
de´monter l’existence d’une solution. Cependant, la question de l’unicite´ de cette solution
n’est e´tudie´e pas en profondeur. Il semble que la solution est unique pour presque toutes
les fonctions et pour presque tout nombre de consommateurs. Le second re´sultat impor-
tant est la pre´sence d’au moins un contrat non-monitore´ dans l’ensemble des contrats
optimaux. Ce re´sultat tient pour n’importe quelle forme fonctionnelle de la fonction de
couˆts d’administration.
Dans de prochains travaux sur le sujet, l’impact sur le bien-eˆtre des consommateurs
devrait eˆtre e´tudie´. Ce point peut devenir tre`s inte´ressant dans le cadre de monopoleur
e´tatique ou re´gule´. Pour le moment, il me semble que l’impact est tre`s diﬃcile a` pre´voir.
Une autre extension possible devrait se faire au niveau d’un marche´ oligopolistique. Ce-
pendant, l’e´tude de la question du monitoring pour des ﬁrmes en compe´tition semble tre`s
complexe puisque la multidimensionnalite´ des pre´fe´rences, le nombre, le type de contrats et
la composition des contrats rendent le proble`me tre`s complexe. L’utilisation de simulations
nume´riques pourrait rendre cette e´tude possible.
Pour le second chapitre, j’ai analyse´ la rationalisation des pre´fe´rences des agents dans le
cadre d’allocations de biens indivisibles. Puisque le nombre de sous-ensembles d’allocations
et le nombre de proﬁls de pre´fe´rence est trop grand lorsque le nombre de biens est supe´rieur
a` 3, j’ai utilise´ la notion de cycle pour e´tudier la question. Dans un premier temps, je trouve
que l’existence d’un cycle dans l’ensemble des optimums de Pareto nous informe sur les
pre´fe´rences des agents qui composent le cycle. Ces derniers, pour chaque pair de biens
qui sont des voisins imme´diats dans le cycle, ont les meˆmes pre´fe´rences. De plus, si le
nombre d’agents qui composent le cycle est un nombre premier, alors tous les agents de ce
18La seule hypothe`se nouvelle que j’introduis est le concept de ∆u-monotonicity.
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cycle ont les meˆmes pre´fe´rences sur l’ensemble des biens du cycle. Dans un second temps,
je de´termine le nombre minimal de cycles qui implique la pre´sence d’un cycle complet.
Ce re´sultat peut eˆtre utile pour de´terminer la pre´sence ne´cessaire d’allocations dans un
cycle. Dans un troisie`me temps, je trouve des contraintes sur le nombre d’allocations que
l’ensemble des optimums de Pareto doit contenir.
Le troisie`me chapitre traite principalement de la question des fusions en pre´sence de
contraintes auto-exe´cutoires. Dans la premie`re partie, j’utilise des fonctions d’utilite´ de
type CARA pour solutionner explicitement le contrat optimal. Je peux e´galement tracer
les frontie`res de Pareto dans les diﬀe´rents cas ou` un contrat de type ﬁrst best peut eˆtre
auto-exce´cutoire ou non. La seconde partie s’attarde a` l’impact d’une augmentation de
la variance sur le contract optimal. Plus pre´cise´ment, j’e´tudie le comportement des seuils
pour avoir un contrat non-trivial, de type ﬁrst best ou non, suite a` un changement dans
les revenus de la ﬁrme. Suite a` un certain type de changement dans la distribution de
revenus qui augmentent la variance, les seuils diminuent alors qu’il n’est pas possible de
conclure pour d’autres types de changement. Finalement, la troisie`me partie s’inte´resse a`
la question des fusionnements dans le contexte de contrats auto-exce´cutoires. Je trouve
que les fusions peuvent augmenter le bien-eˆtre meˆme lorsque les revenus des ﬁrmes sont
positivement corre´le´s. Ce re´sultat provient du fait que l’augmentation de la variance fait
en sorte qu’il devient possible pour la ﬁrme fusionne´e, sous certaines valeurs de β, de
signer un contrat non-trivial alors qu’il est impossible pour la ﬁrme non-fusionne´e de le
faire. Cependant, pour qu’une fusion soit be´ne´ﬁque, il faut que le taux d’escompte soit
relativement bas.
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